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ABSTRACT
This thesis addresses the problem of privacy violations due to the usage of smart
devices. Many services are offered through the usage of applications built for smart
devices. The convenience offered by the smart devices also increases the risk of privacy
breach for their users. The privacy of the smart device users can be breached in many
ways e.g., identity, location and query privacy.
We studied the problem of identity privacy first. While using the cloud services, users
don’t want to disclose their identities to the cloud server. One way to protect identity
privacy from cloud server is anonymous authentication. We propose anonymous
authentication scheme utilizing rotating group signatures based on Elliptic curve
cryptography (ECC) to provide complete anonymity to the users of the healthcare
applications. Furthermore, We have employed The Onion Router (TOR) to provide
privacy at the network layer.
Then we studied the problem of location privacy for smart devices. In many smart
health applications, users’ location information is periodically sent to hospitals and
this information helps hospitals to provide improved health care services. Location
information together with time stamp can reveal private information such as person’s
life style, places frequently visited by the person and personal interests. Thus, it is
important to protect the location privacy of a patient. We proposed a location privacy
protection mechanism in which location privacy is protected while the utility of the
location data is maintained. In the proposed mechanism, a main processing unit
(MPU) attached to a patient’s body generates the perturbed location by considering
the distance between the patient’s location and the pre-identified sensitive locations
for the user. The proposed scheme preserves the privacy of the location data while
preserving the utility without the help of any trusted third party.
v
Finally, we studied the problem of query privacy. We propose an efficient and privacy
preserving clustering algorithm on public Cloud for spatiotemporal data i.e., trajec-
tories. Mobile devices create a huge amount of spatiotemporal data which is used my
many applications to provide the services. Spatiotemporal dataset contains sensitive
information, therefore, directly outsourcing spatiotemporal data to Cloud servers will
raise privacy concerns. To address the problem of privacy, we have proposed a privacy
preserving clustering algorithm that can be efficiently outsourced for data processing
on the Cloud servers. The proposed scheme allows Cloud server to perform clustering
operation directly on encrypted spatiotemporal data, while preserving the privacy.
Extensive experimental and theoretical evaluations have been carried out on the
proposed methods with the existing ones. The results demonstrate that the proposed
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Chapter 1
Introduction
With the growing use of smart devices and advancement in mobile technology, most
of the businesses are offering their services online through the use of smart applica-
tions such as appointment booking and health monitoring. The key mission of these
technological advancement is to provide better service and improve the quality of life.
Majority of the users prefer to use their smart devices such as smart phones, tablets
etc to interact with these services. For instance, a user can query weather updates
from the wireless sensor network deployed for environment monitoring, emergency
weather warnings can be sent directly to smart devices to warn the users, social net-
working sites like Facebook may recommend friends in the vicinity to join you for an
outdoor activity.
Also, recent advances in biosensors, wireless network and embedded systems have
assisted the rapid development of a wide range of wearable and implantable sensors
in the human body. To collect crucial health data such as blood pressure level, and
heart rate, many smart phone based health applications have been developed in the
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recent past [1, 2]. The data from the sensors is sent to the Cloud server, where data
is analyzed to improve the level of healthcare services given to the users.
The increasing necessity for massive computation and excessive amounts of storage
is driving the service providers to use Cloud based servers, because of the many
advantages they are offering, such as cost saving and scalability. However, sharing
data on un-trusted Clouds put users privacy at risk. Cloud computing can also
result in serious Cloud specific privacy issues such as losing physical control over your
data. Unless we provide complete security and privacy protection, patients hesitate
to transfer their private or sensitive data to the Cloud. There are some challenges
which we must overcome to build a trustworthy and secure data storage/processing
system for healthcare applications on the Cloud. These challenges are as follows [3]
• Losing physical control: Although outsourcing the data to the Clouds reduces
the capital and operational expenditure. The risks associated with losing phys-
ical control over data must not be ignored. We need to build mechanisms to
protect users’ privacy, confidentiality and integrity.
• Multi-tenancy: Due to virtualization, it is now possible that multiple customers
share the same physical storage, with the help of some resource allocation policy.
However, it is relatively easy for a malicious user to illegally access data that
does not belong to him in such an environment.
• Privacy breach: With all the existing technologies and huge processing power
at the disposal of an attacker, it is much more challenging to protect the privacy
of an individual. For example, an eavesdropper analysing the browsing habits
and digital footprints can find out a lot about our daily activities.
The privacy of a smart device user can be breached directly or indirectly. Direct
Page 2
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privacy violation involves revealing personal information such as location footprints,
username and biometric features to a third party whereas, indirect violation involves
extracting the information from the hidden patterns by an eavesdropper.
To preserve the privacy of users, many relationships between user and authentication
server must be hidden during the communication rounds between them which are
discussed as follows:
• Anonymity: The patient must be able to authenticate anonymously with au-
thentication server without revealing his/her personal details.
• Unlinkability: The authentication server and eavesdropper should not be able
to link whether two or more authentication requests are coming from the same
patient. If multiple requests by the same patient can be linked together by an
eavesdropper or authentication server, the patient may be identified.
• Traceability: It is important to identify the user in some cases. Providing
complete anonymity to the patients sounds very appealing but also has some
serious implications. Total anonymity for the system can be achieved at the
cost of compromising auditing process which means auditing for the system is
not possible. For example, a malicious patient can overload the system with
fake appointment bookings or unnecessary ambulance calls and we will have
no way to find the source of the malicious request. Obviously, for practical
application scenarios, this is not the ideal case. Therefore, we need a mechanism
which provides maximum anonymity to the patients as long as they do not
misbehave. In case the patient misbehaves, his identity should be revealed and
his membership could be revoked if necessary.
• Resistance to attacks: It is important for a system to be resistant to all possible
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attacks i.e., eavesdropping, replay attacks, man in the middle attack etc.
• Integrity: The transmitting messages should be verifiable by the receiving party.
1.1 Background and Motivation
Protecting the identity, location and query privacy of the smart devices is very crucial.
The unexpected growth in the use of smart devices has outpaced the ability to control
the identity location and query protection. The mobile services subscribers with
Internet connection or growing rapidly everyday. With ever expanding number of
users for smart devices, the threat to the users’ privacy cannot be ignored [4].
Using smart devices to access such services on-line can disclose sensitive information
about the users in many possible ways:
• The public Cloud server receiving the queries and storing users data is often
considered an adversary. For instance, it may disclose the sensitive data to
other third parties for some financial gains.
• All queries sent and received through the communication networks i.e., (3G,
Wireless) may be exposed to an attacker. An attacker may eavesdrop or tamper
with the data during the communication process in order to compromise the
privacy of the users.
In this thesis, we will discuss the three important aspects of users’ privacy namely,
location privacy, identity privacy and query privacy. The information related to iden-
tity, location and query is very sensitive as it can reveal behavior patterns, interests,
preferences and habits of the users [5].
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1.1.1 Identity Privacy
By identity privacy breach, we mean disclosure of user’s identity every time he/she
accesses a service using a smart device. If a user provides his/her authentication
credentials every time he/she will use the service, the third party service provider
can correlate users and their activities.
In order to access services from the third parties, the users of the smart devices have to
create an account with the service provider first by providing their identity informa-
tion in one form or another such as email address, postal address and phone number.
Whenever a user has to access one of the services on-line, he has to go through the
identity verification process, also called authentication to confirm if he/she is entitled
to use the services. The authentication process involves revealing the identity of a
user (i.e., login credentials). The service provider verifies the information to grant or
deny access to the services.
The process of identity verification raises following privacy concerns [6]:
• Collecting the personal information
• Misuse of collected data
• Disclosure of personal information to third parties
The privacy violation can occur either directly or indirectly. The direct violation
involves revealing personal information i.e., login credentials, to the authentication
server. The indirect violation involves eavesdropping the communication channel
and linking multiple requests from an individual user to reveal his identity. The basic
framework for authentication is that different service providers host their servers on
Page 5
Section 1.1 Chapter 1
Clouds and the register users are allowed to access/utilize the provided services by
authenticating themselves. During the authentication process, the privacy of the user
can be breached by either an eavesdropper/attacker or by a malicious administrator.
Most of the existing schemes only focus on protecting the identity privacy of the
users’ from eavesdroppers or attackers. The existing schemes which consider Cloud
service provider as an untrusted entity normally involves a trusted third party who
is aware of the actual identities of the users.
In recent years, many approaches have been proposed by the researchers to protect the
privacy of smart device users. The approaches can be broadly classified into Identity
based [7–12], Pseudonyms based [13–16] and Group signature based approaches [17–
20].
1.1.2 Location Privacy
Location privacy breach is the disclosure of the physical location of the user. Many
services provided now are dependent upon the location of the users. For instance, to
effective use the location based services (LBS), users must disclose their locations to
get the accurate results. If an attacker can eavesdrop this data for a certain period of
time, the attacker can easily draw the patterns from the data using some data mining
techniques (i.e., Home address, work address, favorite bar/club etc).
Nowadays, there are many applications where users have to disclose their locations to
a server or trusted third party (TTP) to effectively use the services. For instance, in
many smart health care applications, users’ location along with the time-stamp can
assist in diagnosis and treatment. In addition, other applications like location based
services (LBS) are based on disclosing the location.
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When the location is automatically sent to an untrusted server on an ongoing basis,
huge amount of potentially sensitive information can be gathered by analyzing the
location information. For example, users work or home address can be identified
along with the lifestyle of the user. Thus, it is very important to protect the location
privacy while using such applications.
Location privacy can be defined as the inability of eavesdropper or untrusted server to
know a user’s current or previous locations. Several mechanisms have been proposed
to protect the location privacy of the user in various application scenarios. They
can be broadly classified in to three categories i.e., trusted third party (TTP) based
approaches [21–24], dummy location generation based approaches [25–30].
1.1.3 Query Privacy
Query privacy breach is related to the disclosure of the contents or results of the
query to eavesdropper or untrusted third party service provider. If the queries made
by users are revealed to untrusted sources, the users can be profiled based on their
habits or preferences.
The users of the smart devices will often issue queries on the dataset collected by
other smart devices or the dataset already stored on Cloud. As the data management
directly influence the quality of the service provided. Most of the data stored on Cloud
servers may be used for data mining purposes. For example, the user may want to
know the best restaurant in town, frequently visited places in a city or nearest hospital
with a cardiology department.
To extract useful information from the data, we usually need to group similar data
into clusters. The aim of clustering is to build different features from the data that
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characterize data in each group uniquely. The data is often stored and processed in
encrypted format on the Cloud server [31–38].
For the users of the smart devices the privacy of the query and data stored has always
been a concern. In reality, both Cloud server and the medium used to transfer and
process data cannot be trusted. There have been cases where the privacy of the users
have been breached either by the internal or external attackers.
The general framework to preserve the query privacy is to keep the service provider
unaware of data being processed.
Several approaches have been proposed to provide the query privacy. They can be
broadly classified into anonymization based techniques [31–34, 39–41] and crypto-
graphic based techniques [35–38,42–45].
1.2 Thesis Outline
Chapter 2 serves to define the problems and review the relevant work in the area of
privacy protection for smart devices.
Chapter 3 presents a generalized anonymous authentication scheme for smart health
care applications. The scheme utilizes elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) based group
signature scheme.
Chapter 4 presents a scheme to protect the location privacy of the smart users using
a modified perturbation based technique. The validity of the method is illustrated
by simulation results.
Chapter 5 illustrates the scheme for privacy preserving clustering of trajectory data.
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Experiment results demonstrate the performance of the algorithm.
Chapter 6 draws conclusions and provides suggestions for future research.
1.3 Contributions
The following are original contributions of this thesis:
1. An anonymous authentication scheme is proposed to preserve the identity pri-
vacy of the user. The scheme not only protects the privacy of the user from
adversary but also from the untrusted Cloud server.
2. A new location perturbation scheme is proposed for protection of location pri-
vacy.
3. A privacy preserving algorithm is developed for clustering of trajectory data
based on MapReduce.
The following is a list of publications that describe part of the work shown in this
thesis:
1. Mehmood, A., Natgunanathan, I., Xiang, Y., Poston, H. and Zhang, Y., 2018.
Anonymous Authentication Scheme for Smart Cloud Based Healthcare Appli-
cations. IEEE Access, 6, pp.33552-33567.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries and Literature Review
The previous chapter briefly discussed how the privacy of the user can be breached
in many ways and outline the motivation and structure of the thesis. This chapter
will review some relevant techniques and present the problem formulations.
2.1 Preliminaries
2.1.1 Bilinear Pairings
A pairing based cryptography is based on pairing between elements of two crypto-
graphic groups to a third cryptographic group to construct or analyse a cryptographic
system.
Bilinear pairings are defined by the set of three abelian groups G1, G2 and GT over
a finite field Zn together with a deterministic function e, called a bilinear map with
following properties
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1. G1 and G2 are two cyclic groups of prime order p.
2. P1 is a generator of G1 and P2 is generator of G2
3. e is a computable map e : G1 ×G2 → GT with the following properties
(a) Bilinearity: for all P ∈ G1, Q ∈ G2 and a, b ∈ Z, e(P a, Qb) = e(P,Q)ab
(b) Non-degeneracy: e(P1, P2) 6= 1.
Bilinear pairing can use ranges of pairing groups but if these groups are elliptic curves,
this mapping has a very useful interaction with the discrete logarithm problem. El-
liptic curve cryptography was proposed by Miller [46]. It has been used widely to
provide security in the algorithms. ECC can be implemented in many different ways
rather than as a single encryption algorithm. The security strength of ECC is much
stronger than other public key encryptions schemes like RSA and Diffie-Hellman [47].
ECC provides stronger security with smaller key sizes. For instance, 160 bits in ECC
provides the same security level as 1024 bits key in RSA. Due to the smaller key size
and scalar multiplication used to provide security, ECC is much more efficient than
RSA and Diffie-Hellman.
2.1.2 Group Signature Schemes
A group signature scheme is based on digital signatures [48]. Group signatures allow
a group manager to issue keys to a number of members. A member can then use that
key to prove membership in that group without identifying himself. Anyone with
the public key may verify this proof. Additionally, traceable group signatures allow
the group manager to open a proof of membership to determine which member was
responsible, and to revoke a member.
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Keys and signatures
In any traceable group signature scheme there are a number of keys and transcripts
involved
• GM : The group manager key which is used to issue member keys and open
proofs of the membership if needed to reveal which member signed the message
• GP : The group public key which is known to everyone in the protocol and used
in every step
• Ci : A transcript of key issue process for user i, used to identify and revoke
members after opening a proof of membership
• Mi : A key, known only to one member of the group, generated by the issue
process, and used to prove group membership
• Pj : A proof of membership during jth authentication, generated during the
prove process
• Ij : A piece of the transcript Ci extracted from the proof Pj
• Ti : A trace of a member, generated to revoke a member and used to verify a
proof of membership comes from a member in good standing
• R : Random numbers, used in most phases of the protocol
Phases
• Generate : The group manager generates a group manager key and derives a
group public key from it.
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R→ GM
R,GM → GP
• Issue : A member and a group manager together generate a key from the group
manager key and public key, leaving the manager with a membership transcript
and the member with a member key
R,GM , GP → Ci,Mi
• Prove : A member demonstrates their possession of a member key to a third
party, leaving both with the same proof of membership.
R,Mi → Pj
• Verify : The third party may then check that a proof of membership against a
group public key.
Pj, GP
• Open : The group manager may extract identifying information from a proof
of membership, revealing which member did the proving.
Pj, GM → Ij
• Revoke :The group manager extracts information from the issue transcript so
that third parties may check proofs of membership for particular members
Ci, GM → Ti
• Trace : A third party, given the tracing information from above, may check a
proof of membership for the member.
Ti, GP → Pj
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2.2 Related work
In this section, we will review the related work for anonymous authentication, location
privacy and privacy preserving clustering.
2.2.1 Anonymous authentication
The related work on anonymous authentication schemes can be broadly classified into
public key cryptosystems (PKC ) based schemes [49–58], identity based cryptosystems
schemes [7–9, 59–61], pseudonyms based schemes [15, 16], and combined scheme [62]
which uses both identity based encryption and pseudonyms.
Apart form the aforementioned schemes, numerous other anonymous authentication
schemes have been proposed in different application domains such as wireless body
area networks, vehicular ad hoc networks, pervasive social networks and applications
based on smartcards [13,17–20,63–73].
Anonymous authentication schemes based on PKC in [49, 50] were infeasible for
mobile networks because of the computational resources required by PKC modular
exponentiation, which consumes more resources than what a mobile device can of-
fer. To minimize the computational requirements, various anonymous authentication
schemes based on elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC ) have been proposed [51–58],
which have better performance because of the smaller key size used in ECC.
The performance of ECC based schemes are enhanced by identity based cryptosys-
tems [7–9, 59–61] over ECC. Unlike the traditional PKC, the identity based cryp-
tosystems exploit public identity such as ID or email address as the user’s public key
to eliminate the cost related to the management of public key certificates, which is
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often desirable in mobile environments. However, the schemes built upon the iden-
tity based cryptosystems have two major drawbacks [9]. Firstly, the identity based
authentication systems suffer from the key escrow problem, where a key needed to
encrypt/decrypt is held in escrow so that under certain circumstances, an authorized
party may gain access to the key. The key escrow systems are considered as a secu-
rity risk as the escrow agent holding all the cryptographic keys can be a single failure
point or may leak information. Secondly, once a user’s private key is compromised,
it is very hard to revoke the user [7, 8].
Anonymous authentication schemes are also emerging through the usage of pseudonyms
and other techniques to protect privacy [15,16]. Sun et al. gave solutions to privacy
and emergency response based on the anonymous credential, pseudo-random number
generator, and the knowledge of proof for peer to peer systems [15,16]. However, when
directly applied to the distributed healthcare system, these schemes are impractical
due to heavy computational overhead. In [62], Lin et al. proposed a strong privacy
preserving scheme against global eavesdropping (SAGE ), utilizing pseudonyms and
identity based encryption to increase the level of security. This scheme provides both
content and context oriented privacy resisting strong global adversary.
In recent years, two factor (password and smartcard) authentication schemes [63–66]
have been proposed. However, these schemes have limitations as the smartcard and
password both can be lost, stolen or duplicated. Also, some of these schemes [63,64]
require the server to maintain a password table for verification purposes, making
them suffer from some possible attacks such as password disclosure attacks and server
spoofing attacks. To tackle the problems in two factor based authentication schemes,
three factor (biometric, password and smart card) [67–70], authentication schemes
have been proposed. To enhance the security, biometric characteristics are employed
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as a third factor to design a strong authentication scheme. These schemes are designed
for smart cards. However, smart cards can’t perform more sophisticated tasks like
connecting to the server or communication with the server therefore, these schemes
are not suitable for authentication using smart phones.
In [71], an anonymous authentication scheme in the Cloud environment for e-health
has been proposed. The scheme in [71] is based on blind signatures which allow users
to consume Cloud services anonymously. The scheme does not provide any details
about user registration and revocation. The security analysis of the scheme is not
discussed in detail.
In [72] and [73], anonymous authentication schemes for wireless body area networks
(WBANs) were proposed.
The scheme in [72] is based on bilinear pairings and it proposed an efficient anonymous
authenticated key agreement scheme for WBANs. The scheme in [73] is based on
certificateless encryption, which was designed to eliminate the drawbacks of the PKI
based schemes. It does not require digital certificate and identity based encryption,
i.e., no key escrow problem. The schemes in [72] and [73] were both efficient, however,
revocation was not clearly defined.
In [19], an anonymous authentication scheme was proposed for wireless networks using
Verifier-Local Revocation (VLR) group signature scheme. However, the scheme in [19]
is vulnerable to replay attacks and a malicious Group Manager can impersonate a
user.
In addition, the anonymous authentication schemes based on group signatures have
been proposed in many areas [13,17,18,20]. The group signature schemes have been
widely used in vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) to realize anonymous authen-
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tication [13, 17, 20]. To improve the contextual awareness, the vehicles communicate
with each other by broadcasting safety messages with position beacons. And the
group signatures are used to protect the identity of the users sending safety messages
to protect the location and identity privacy. In [18], the group signatures are em-
ployed to preserve privacy in pervasive social networking (PSN ), where PSN supports
instant social activities at any time and anywhere. The anonymous authentication
is achieved by authenticating the trust levels rather than the identities of nodes.
The scheme achieves anonymity and conditional traceability by utilizing group sig-
natures and with the support of Trusted Authority (TA). However, the anonymous
authentication schemes in [13,17,18,20] are very different in context to our proposed
scheme.
Most of these aforementioned schemes provide anonymity from the eavesdropper.
However, the service provider is still able to extract the real identity of the user to
provide him access to the services and can link multiple messages coming from the
same user.
2.2.2 Location privacy
TTP architecture based privacy protection mechanisms
Generally, TTP collects location information from several users and send the collected
location information to the LBS without revealing the identities of the users.
In [74], Gruteser et al. introduced a middleware architecture and algorithms that can
be used by a centralized location broker service, to preserve the location privacy. In
this case, the centralized location broker service acts as the TTP and users exchange
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information with external LBSs through a central TTP server. In the first stage an
encrypted connection is established between users and the TTP server. When users
want to use the LBS services, they send the location and time information to the
TTP server in an encrypted form. The encryption is used to protect the location
privacy of the nodes from the adversary who eavesdrops the communication between
users and a TTP server. The TTP server receives the encrypted information from
the user, decrypts it, removes personal identifiers such as network addresses and adds
noise to the location data based on a cloaking algorithm. In [74], LBSs collect and use
de-personalized [75] data from the TTP server which ensures the individuals cannot
be identified by analyzing their location data. One specific drawback associated
with the mechanism proposed in [74] is that it requires the TTP server should have
adequate users within the same geographical location to maintain anonymity from
the eavesdropper.
The research work presented in [76] provided a unified privacy personalization frame-
work to protect location privacy for users with context-sensitive privacy requirements.
It facilitates users choose the level of privacy and the amount of spatio-temporal res-
olutions the framework is ready to accept when the framework requesting the privacy
preserving LBSs. In [76], user’s location information is perturbed in a TTP server
via a spatio-temporal cloaking algorithm and users’ identities (such as IP addresses)
are removed from the location data.
In [77], Kalnis et al. proposed a transformation based anonymization to compute
answers for nearest neighbour search without revealing the identity of the users. The
research presented in [77] also focuses on optimizing the process of anonymizing the
requests and processing the transformed spatial queries. Similar to several previously
developed location privacy protection mechanism, the mechanism in [77] cannot pro-
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tect the privacy for users issuing continuous spatial queries.
A reciprocal framework is proposed in [78] using TTP, where several types of privacy
preserving spatial K-anonymity algorithms are implemented. This framework can
support users with different query frequencies. In addition to this, the proposed
framework is used to implement several partitioning techniques on two spatial indices,
R*-trees and Quad-trees.
In [79], Vu et al., presented K-anonymous location privacy protection algorithms for
participatory sensing. To achieve K-anonymous location privacy, a TTP is used.
TTP removes the user’s ID and chooses an anonymizing spatial region containing at
least (K − 1) users in the surrounding area. The users’ query and the spatial region
are sent to an un-trusted LBS. In their work, a locality-sensitive hashing is used to
preserve the locality. An efficient and flexible searching algorithm is also employed
to reduce the computational complexity.
In [80], Pan et al. considered a scenario where moving mobile users continuously issue
different location-based queries. It has been shown in [80] that most of the location
cloaking algorithms in the literature cannot effectively protect the location privacy
of users in this scenario. This is because they use either cloaking granularity or k-
anonymity to protect the location privacy. For example, in [81] and [82] only cloaking
granularity is considered as the privacy matrix. If a user is in a given cloaked region
this mechanism cannot protect the identity of the user. To deal with this problem,
in [80], a cloaking is proposed by combining both the location k-anonymity and
cloaking granularity as privacy metrics.
The major drawback of the TTP architecture based location privacy protection mech-
anisms [74], [76]- [80] is that when TTP server’s security is compromised by an internal
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staff member or by a hacker, user’s location privacy is breached. In other words, in-
troduction of a TTP effectively transfers the security risks from the LBS server to
a TTP server. TTP servers are generally attractive to adversaries as large amount
of users related location information are stored in TTP servers. Moreover, in most
cases the TTP server ensures that only pseudonyms are sent to the LBSs. However,
location information with corresponding time information can lead to the identifi-
cation of the individuals [83]. Furthermore, a particular user’s location privacy can
be breached, if adversarial users (mainly from same geographical location) directly
collaborates with an un-trusted LBS.
Dummy location generation based privacy protection mechanisms
In dummy location generation based privacy protection mechanisms, fake or dummy
location is created randomly corresponding to each actual location and only the
dummy location information is sent to the LBS for querying purposes [25–29].
In [25], Kido et al. proposed a location privacy preserving technique in which users
generate several dummy locations to send to LBS with their actual location informa-
tion. The main idea here is that an un-trusted LBS cannot differentiate the dummy
locations from the actual location, thus users’ location privacy is preserved to some
extent. In [25], dummy locations are generated by an algorithm called “Moving in
a Neighborhood”, which is based on the previous dummy location. The mechanism
in [25] also considers the number of other users in the area when creating the dummy
locations.
To protect location privacy, a framework called SpaceTwist is proposed in [26], which
includes a client-side processing algorithm to reduce the computational complexity
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in the server query processing. The SpaceTwist framework retrieves the results from
LBS incrementally. The querying process starts with a dummy location and continues
until an accurate query result can be reported. The simple querying process used in
SpaceTwist framework makes the framework computationally efficient. In addition
to this, a granular search technique is employed to exploit tolerance for relaxing the
accuracy of query results.
In [27], two dummy location generation mechanisms were proposed to provide loca-
tion privacy to users. These dummy location based mechanisms, called Virtual Circle-
based and Virtual Grid based mechanisms, are developed based on the techniques
used in [28] to achieve desired k-anonymity against the adversaries with additional
information such as user’s query probability in the local map. In the mechanisms pre-
sented in [27] dummy locations are created from several temporary locations created
by the Virtual Circle-based algorithm.
Neighbouring dummies created by dummy generation algorithms may have a close
spatiotemporal correlation. This can compromise the location privacy of users. To
overcome this problem, in [29], Liu et al. proposed a dummy generation algorithm
by considering spatiotemporal correlation from three aspects, namely time reachabil-
ity, direction similarity and in-degree/out-degree. Security analysis presented in [29]
shows that the proposed mechanism significantly reduces the spatiotemporal corre-
lation between neighboring dummy location sets.
In a TTP architecture based location privacy protection mechanisms, users do not
have physical control over TTP servers. To solve this problem a fog server is intro-
duced in [30], which extends cloud computing to the edge of the network. In [30], to
mislead the adversaries, dummy trajectories are created similar to the actual trajecto-
ries of the users. A dummy rotation algorithm is employed to ensure anonymity. The
Page 22
Section 2.2 Chapter 2
dummy rotation algorithm is designed by incorporating the concepts of similarity,
intersection, practicability and correlation.
The dummy location generation based mechanisms protect location privacy at the
expense of reducing the accuracy of the services they receive from the LBSs.
2.2.3 Privacy preserving clustering
Distance measures
Different similarity measure for trajectory data are discussed here. To measure the
similarity between two trajectories, several techniques are proposed in the literature.
These techniques can be broadly classified into three categories; Network constrained
based distance techniques [84, 85], wrapping based distance techniques [86–89] and
shape based distance techniques [90–93].
Network constrained based distance techniques assume that the road network is
known and that the trajectories are mapped perfectly on road network [84,85]. Most
of these schemes rely on the grid based representation of the road network trajectories
and use grid based distance measure to compare the similarity between two trajecto-
ries [85]. In typical network constrained based distance techniques, the movement of
the object is aligned with the road segments and vertices of the road network. Most
of the existing methods use a small trajectory data and a simple road network for
the experiments, which leaves a question mark on the scalability of such techniques.
Wrapping based distance techniques [86–89] aims to solve the problem associated
with different speed and length. As the distance measures like Euclidean and Man-
hattan distances [94] compare discrete objects of same length which is not suitable
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for trajectories. Wrapping based distance techniques solve this problem by enabling
matching trajectories with different indexes by finding an optimal alignment between
trajectories. Several wrapping based distance measures have been proposed in liter-
ature. The performance of wrapping based distance is hindered by noise inherent to
spatiotemporal data and it often requires the data to be well balanced.
Shape based distance techniques [90–93] try to capture the geometric features of
the trajectories. The most well-known techniques in this category include Hausdroff
distance [90] and Fréchet distance [91]. Calculating such distances are complicated
and resource intensive.
Another popular Shape based distance was proposed by Lin et al. known as OWD
[92]. OWD compares trajectories as a whole, considering their shapes and physical
distances. This distance also has high computational complexity.
To further improve the technique in [92], Philippe et al. proposed a new shape based
distance called Symmetrized Segment-Path Distance (SSPD) [93]. The technique is
suitable for comparing whole trajectories without considering their indexing. The
scheme also has high computational complexity.
Clustering techniques
Clustering techniques are designed to divide objects into different groups according to
special metrics in such a way that the objects with similar features end up in the same
group [95]. Clustering techniques such as K-mean, C-mean, K-medoid, DBSCAN, hi-
erarchical clustering analysis, and affinity prorogation, have been successfully applied
to data engineering and knowledge discovery [96–98].
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Clustering methods for trajectories can be classified into hierarchy based, density
based, and partition based methods. In hierarchy based methods, the dataset is
decomposed based on either a bottom up (combining) or a top down (split) hierarchy.
The problem with hierarchical clustering is that it is an irreversible process. Once
the data is clustered into groups, it can’t be revoked. BRICH [99] and CURE [100]
are two popular hierarchy based clustering algorithms.
Density based methods cluster the trajectories based on their densities. Given the
centroids, the points closed to the centroids are packed together and added to the
clusters. DBSCAN [101] is the popular density based clustering algorithm, while it
cannot cluster the trajectories with large difference in their densities. To solve this
problem, the trajectories are partitioned into sub-trajectories before applying the
clustering algorithm. Hence, it is not suitable if whole trajectories are required to be
clustered.
In Partition based clustering methods, the number of clusters are predetermined.
The popular algorithm in this category includes K-mean [38] and C-mean [95].
Privacy preserving clustering
Privacy preserving clustering approaches can be broadly classified into two categories:
perturbation or transformation based techniques [31–34] and cryptography based
techniques [35–38].
Techniques based on data perturbation or transformation encrypts the dataset by
distance preserving data perturbation or transformation techniques [31, 32, 34]. The
transformed data is then published on public Cloud for further processing such as data
mining and clustering. However, such techniques may not achieve enough privacy and
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accuracy. For instance, the amount of noise added in the transformation process will
decrease the accuracy of the results. In addition, the encrypted data may be recovered
by an adversary who has got access to few unencrypted data records [33].
In our knowledge, there is no existing work on privacy preserving clustering for trajec-
tory data using cryptography techniques. However, the problem of privacy preserving
clustering have been explored in a multiparty setting scenario for different types of
data [37,38]. In [37,38], the owners of distributed dataset interact with each other for
clustering without disclosing their own dataset to each other. The problem with these
designs is that they rely very heavily on cryptographic primitives like secure circuit
evaluation, homomorphic encryption and oblivious transfers. Hence, these techniques
are inefficient for large scale databases. Often, the dataset for clustering is owned by
a single party, who aims to minimize the computational cost by delegating the clus-
tering task to a public Cloud server [37,38]. In [37,38], homomorphic encryption has
been employed before outsourcing the dataset to public Cloud for clustering. After
each round of clustering, results are sent back to the client. The client updates the
cluster centers locally and sends the encrypted cluster centers back to Cloud server
for next round.
2.3 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we discussed the preliminaries and reviewed the literature. We first
discussed the problems associated with anonymous authentication. A number of
anonymous authentication schemes were reviewed.
We have reviewed the literature for existing approached for location privacy. The
problems associated with TTP based approached and dummy location generation
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based approaches were discussed in detail. We further analyzed the literature related
to privacy preserving clustering and discussed the problems.
In the rest of the thesis, we will further investigate these problems and develop





This chapter presents the anonymous authentication scheme for smart Cloud based
healthcare applications. To provide the services to the users while maintaining pri-
vacy, we propose an anonymous authentication scheme utilizing rotating group sig-
natures based on ECC, which is both secure and efficient.
We have utilized a rotating group signature scheme based on ECC, to provide anony-
mous authentication to smart Cloud based application users to prevent them from
untrusted authentication server and against eavesdropping. Our scheme provides a
mechanism for traceability with minimal compromise on privacy, in case of a mali-
cious activity. Each group shares an expiration date and members renew their keys
regularly, to minimize authentication time or the need to reveal a user’s past au-
thentications when his/her key is revoked. Anonymous authentication systems are
usually considered in isolation. A service provider operating over the Internet can
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link subsequent requests by IP address, potentially connecting them to a physical
location or an individual. We use TOR to provide anonymity on the network level,
and minimize the information available to a service provider. A TOR hidden ser-
vice cannot be accessed in a non-anonymous fashion, and complements anonymous
authentication schemes nicely, leaving the service provider with little information to
link subsequent connections.
3.1 Introduction
We have considered a system model for a hospital where some of the hospital’s in-
frastructure is hosted on the public Cloud to reduce the cost. Hosting the services on
the Cloud also increases the risk of a privacy breach. In order to protect the identity
of the patient during the authentication process, we have proposed an anonymous
authentication model for smart health applications which are used to access the ser-
vices hosted on the public Cloud. Table A.1 summarizes the notations used hereafter
in this chapter to improve the readability.
The system model is described as follows
• Trent represents hospital/clinic, sometimes also referred as Group Manager
(GM ), who has outsourced much of its infrastructure to the Cloud also referred
as Cloud Service Provider (CSP).
• Trent has also hosted a Registration Server (RS ), which provides registration
services to Trent ’s clients.
• CSP provides services to Trent ’s clients, but must not be able to extract any
personal information about Trent ’s clients.
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• Alice, Bob, Carol, and Dave are clients of Trent, utilizing CSP ’s services.
• Mallory might control Trent ’s, CSP ’s and RS ’s Internet connection, alterna-
tively Mallory might control any of Trent ’s clients’ Internet connection.
From a particular security perspective, we have split up the roles to (GM ) and regis-
tration server (RS ). The GM is responsible for system initialization, key generation,
and auditing whereas the RS is responsible only for patient registration. Using this
approach, the GM only has to be on-line to generate keys and during the auditing
process. The RS has to be on-line all the time but it does not need to have access to
the private key of the GM which increases the security of the system. Fig. 3.1 shows
the framework for the proposed anonymous authentication scheme.
Figure 3.1: Framework for Anonymous Authentication.
The identity of the patient is completely hidden from the CSP during the authenti-
cation process. Only in case of a malicious user or an emergency, the identity of the
patient can be revealed with the help of the GM.
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3.1.1 Threat Model
In this work, we consider the CSP as an un-trusted entity. This means that while
the CSP follows the designed protocol, it may try to gain as much information about
the user as possible and keep a log of that. Specifically, two types of adversaries are
considered.
• Weak Adversary: A weak adversary may be an outsider without access to the
system. They are able to eavesdrop the communication channel but unable to
alter any messages.
• Strong Adversary: A strong adversary may be a legitimate but malicious user
with access to the system. They can eavesdrop the communication channel and
may also be able to modify the messages.
The claims made by the proposed protocol (i.e., anonymity, unlinkability, traceability)
are resistant to attacks, and integrity will be tested against both types of adversaries.
In Section 3.3.1 the proofs of security are provided, which demonstrate that the
proposed protocol meets/exceeds the security level of similar schemes.
3.1.2 Privacy Goals
During the authentication process, the CSP can collect the user information by keep-
ing the access logs including access locations, data access patterns and the services
received. This record contains private information about the user which should be
managed securely. The secure management of the users’ private information is very
important as the malicious administrator can pose a serious threat to users’ privacy
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by leaking personal information. Our privacy goal is to keep the service provider un-
aware from the private information of users such as access tokens and access history.
For example, our privacy goals are:
• Alice1 must be able to prove to CSP that she is an authorized client of Trent.
• CSP must not be able to determine the identity of Alice.
• Only Trent should be able to link two performances of the protocol with the
same client together.
• Alice’s account with Trent must be able to expire without compromising her
privacy.
• CSP must keep a log such that only Trent can link multiple requests to each
other if required.
• CSP must not be able to fake the log.
• RS must keep a log such that only Trent can link clients to requests.
• Mallory must not be able to pretend to be RS, CSP, Trent, or Alice.
• Alice must not be able to pretend to be Bob from Trent ’s perspective.
• Trent should be able to revoke Alice’s authorization to use the service with
minimal privacy compromise.
• Alice should be able to authenticate to CSP even when RS in unavailable.
1Here Alice represents one of the Trent ’s clients.
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3.1.3 Platform Constraints
• Alice has an off-the-shelf smartphone connected to the Internet.
• RS has a privately hosted server with maximum availability. We assume that
the server hosted is very secure.
• Trent uses a dedicated computer that is only connected to a network during
key generation and revocation.
• CSP uses the cheapest Cloud service with maximum availability.
3.1.4 Intractable Problems
The security of our proposed protocol is based upon the Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman
problem and the Inverse Bilinear Pairing Operation problem. The Elliptic-Curve
Diffie-Hellman problem states that given a point P on an elliptic curve the result
of the Elliptic Curve Multiplication C = aP , it is computationally infeasible for
someone to determine the value of a [47]. The Inverse Bilinear Pairing Operation
states that given a bilinear pairing operation e and the result of a bilinear pairing
operation E = e(a, b), it is computationally infeasible for someone to determine the
values of a or b [48]. Therefore, any protocol whose security is based upon one or
both of these problems is computationally secure.
3.2 Proposed Scheme for anonymous authentication
The proposed scheme consists of four phases i.e., initialization, Key generation, reg-
istration, authentication and revocation.
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3.2.1 Initialization
The system initialization is done once, when Trent sets up the system.
1. Trent generates a long term private-public signing key pair, KT s and KT p.
2. Trent gives public half of that key i.e., KT p to CSP and RS.
3. The implementation allows the system to use range of pairings, the participants
must first agree upon which pairings to use i.e., (p, P1, G1, P2, G2, GT , e).
4. Trent also selects a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp and shares it with the
participants in the protocol.
3.2.2 Key Generation
When setting up the system Trent generates a new group key that is valid for some
time. The implementation uses group signature scheme based on bilinear pairings.
1. Trent generates the master group key GnM , and generates/derives from that the
public group key GnP . The master group key is simply a random number γ:
GnM ← γ ← Zn (3.1)
The group public key is partially random:
Q← G1 (3.2)
and partially derived from the group manager key:
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R← (P2)γ (3.3)
hence, the group public key is
GnP = (Q,R) (3.4)
2. Trent make a signed certificate ST (GnP , I, E) with KT s containing,
• GnP
• Issue Date
• An Expiry Date
3. Using the CSP’s public key, Trent encrypts and sends that certificate to CSP
and encrypts (using RS’s public key) and sends the same certificate along with
GnM to RS.
4. CSP and RS decrypt and verify that the certificate is actually from Trent with
the help of KT p and RS verifies that GnM goes with GnP .
It is worth nothing that the same process for key generation is needed every time
Trent has to update the group keys.
3.2.3 Registration
When Alice joins the group she registers with RS to get a key for the current group.
1. Alice connects to RS over a secure channel.
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2. Alice demonstrates her identity to RS with, for instance, a username and pass-
word.
3. RS verifies that Alice is authorized to use CSP ’s services until the expiry date
of the current group.
4. RS shares with Alice the bilinear pairing parameters from the initialization
phase which are (P1, G1, P2, G2, GT , e).
5. RS sends Alice the signed certificate ST (GnP , In, En, ) from the key generation
phase.
6. Alice generate a random number,
x← Zn (3.5)
then sends (P1)x to the RS who generates another random number,
t← Zn (3.6)




and sends A and t back to Alice, who can verify that she has successfully joined
by computing the following equation:
e((P1)
x.Q, P2) = e(A,R.(P2)
t) (3.8)
which can be proved by substituting the values of A and R on the R.H.S of Eq.
(3.8) as follows:
e((P1)
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The registration process leaves Alice with a member key,
Mni ← (x, t, A) (3.10)
and the RS with a transcript,
Cni ← ((P1)x, t, A) (3.11)
7. RS encrypts the transcript Cni along with Alice’s identity using KE and records
it in the registration log.
Membership registration process is shown in Fig. 3.2. It is important to note that
when a user Carol has to renew her keys, she has to go through the same process
described in registration phase.
3.2.4 Authentication
When Alice wishes to request a service represented by Z from CSP, she begins the
authentication process:
1. Alice connects to CSP over an anonymous network.
2. Alice sends the group key to authenticate with.
3. CSP verifies the group key matches a stored certificate from Trent and that
the certificate is not expired by checking the expiry En.
4. CSP generates a random number RC and sends it to Alice.
RC ← Zn (3.12)
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Figure 3.2: Member registration process.
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5. Alice and CSP perform a zero knowledge protocol to prove knowledge of x
and/or A without revealing x or A as follows
• Alice generates random r
r ← Zn (3.13)
• Alice calculates a, b, c, and d as follows
a = Q.r (3.14)
b = (P1)
x.Q.r (3.15)
d = r.A (3.16)
c = H(e(d,RC.R.(P2)
t), Z) (3.17)
• Alice generates signature σ as follows
σ = (a, b, c, d) (3.18)
• Alice sends (σ, Z) to CSP.
• CSP calculates
c = H(e(b, RC.P2), Z) (3.19)
and continues to next step if the equality holds true. CSP terminates the
connection with Alice otherwise. It is straightforward to check that the
verification equality holds for a valid signature. We can also prove that
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our proposed scheme satisfies completeness:
e(d,RC.R.(P2)


















• CSP checks that Alice didn’t perform the protocol with the revoked key.
The details of the revocation will be discussed in the Revocation section.
6. CSP performs the requested service represented by Z for Alice.
7. CSP encrypts (a, d, Z) with KE and store it in the audit log so that only Trent
may read it.
The authentication process for a member is shown in Fig. 3.3.
3.2.5 Revocation
When group manager Trent discovers that a user, let’s say Dave has been abusing
the service, he revokes Dave’s key. It is important to note, key revocation necessarily
allows an unscrupulous CSP who keeps an unencrypted log to link all of Dave’s
connections since the last key generation, so it should be used sparingly and not as
the primary means of terminating a client’s service. Membership revocation process
is shown in Fig. 3.4 and described as follows
1. Trent requests the registration log from RS and decrypts it.
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Figure 3.3: Member Authentication Process.
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2. Trent requests the audit log from CSP and decrypts it to get (a, d, Z)
3. Trent uses GnM and the list of Cni to extract which Mni signed the message and
consumed which service.
4. For each record in registration log, Trent tests d.Q = a.A
5. If a match is found, Trent computes the corresponding (P1)x and adds it to the
revocation log
6. To revoke Dave’s membership key, Trent shares the tracing information for
Dave, which is Ti ← (P1)x, with CSP in order to allow CSP to detect proofs of
membership created by Dave and refuse providing services to him.
7. Trent sends Dave’s identity over a secure channel to RS, who removes Dave
from the list of acceptable clients.
3.2.6 Network layer anonymity with TOR
The Onion Router (TOR) project is widely used to provide privacy at the network
layer [102]. Internet data packets have two parts: a data payload (actual message i.e.,
email content, audio file etc.) and a header used for routing. Even if we encrypt the
data payload, data header can still reveal some information about source, destination,
time etc. Instead of using a direct connection, Internet users employ TOR network
by connecting through a series of virtual tunnels. TOR protects its users against
traffic analysis attacks. Traffic analysis can be used to infer who is talking to whom
over a public network.
TOR protects privacy by building a private network pathway. The user’s software
incrementally builds a circuit of encrypted connections through relays on the network.
Page 42
Section 3.2 Chapter 3
Figure 3.4: Membership Revocation Procedure.
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The circuit is extended one hop at a time, and each relay along the way knows which
relay the data is coming from and to which relay the data is going to. No individual
relay is able to know the complete path the data packet has taken.
TOR bounces connections through three relay nodes. They are called entry nodes,
middle relay nodes, and exit nodes. Each of these nodes has a specific role to play.
The entry points to the TOR network are called entry nodes. Middle relay nodes
are used to transport traffic from the entry nodes to exit nodes. It also prevents
the entry guard node and exit node from knowing each other. The exit point of
the TOR network is called an exit node. These exit nodes send traffic to the final
destination intended by the client. Each node in the TOR network knows the key for
decryption of only one layer of encryption. It achieves anonymity because the entry
guard knows only the IP address of the client and the relay node but it does not
know the IP address of the exit node. The exit node only knows the IP address of
the relay node and destination node but does not know the IP address of the entry
guard or the client. An example of how TOR works is demonstrated in Fig. 3.5.
In addition to opening connections to the Internet, users of TOR may connect to
hidden services. The TOR network is a group of volunteer operated servers which
helps improve security and privacy of Internet users. In our scheme, to protect the
patients from traffic analysis attacks as well as to enhance the privacy, we employed
TOR at both server and client sides.
• On Server Side: The TOR provides a program to run on the server side, which
can be configured to forward connections from a hidden service to a port on
the local computer. In the proposed scheme, two hidden services are required:
one pointing to a program running CSP ’s portion of the protocol and another
pointing to a program running RS ’s portion of the protocol. For testing pur-
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Figure 3.5: The Working Mechanism of TOR.
poses these programs may run on the same hardware, but they should run on
different networks practically. Further details on TOR configuration can be
found on the TOR project. 1.
• On Client Side: TOR can be used as a proxy application to encrypt the Internet
traffic and then hides it by bouncing through the series of computers around the
world. Orbot 2 is an example of one of such applications. Orbot allows other
applications on the same device to access hidden services. The test application
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3.3 Scheme Evaluation
3.3.1 Proofs and Discussions
In this section, we will theoretically analyse the security of the proposed scheme and
discuss how it achieves the privacy goals discussed in Section 3.1.2
Anonymity
The first feature that the proposed protocol provides is anonymity for a user, Alice,
from the service provider, CSP. This means that Alice can prove that she is authorized
to use CSP’s services without revealing her identity to CSP.
Proof: The values that Alice is attempting to conceal from CSP are r, t, x, and A.
CSP is provided with the equations
a = Q.r (3.21)
b = (P1)
x.Q.r (3.22)
d = r.A (3.23)
c = e(d,RC.R.(P2)
t) (3.24)
CSP knows the values of a, b, d, e, Q, R, P1, and P2. To determine the value of r
from the first equation, (P1)x from the second equation, A from the third equation
or (P2)t from the fourth equation, it would violate the hardness of the Elliptic-Curve
Diffie-Hellman problem. Therefore, it is computationally infeasible for CSP to de-
termine the values of (r, (P1)x, A, (P2)x), let alone (r, t, x, A). Similarly, given the
fourth equation and the values of c and d, it is computationally infeasible to compute
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the second argument due to the hardness of the Inverse Bilinear Pairing Operation
problem.
Forward Unlinkability
The proposed protocol also provides forward unlinkability of transactions to Alice.
This means that, unless Alice is placed on a revocation list, CSP does not have the
ability to look at any two transactions and determine whether or not they were both
performed by the same user.
Proof: The proposed scheme is forward-unlinkable because all values provided to CSP
are dependent upon a random value, r. In order to connect requests, it is necessary
to calculate the value of, r, which is computationally infeasible by the hardness of
the Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman and Inverse Bilinear Pairing Operation problems.
Traceability
Another feature provided by the proposed protocol is traceability, which also allows
revocation of credentials when a user is found to be abusing the system. This means
that an authorized party has the ability to learn the identity of an abusive user and
revoke their access to the system.
Proof: In order for the proposed scheme to be traceable, it must be possible for an
authorized party to determine the user for a given authentication session. In this
protocol, this is made possible through the combination of information stored by RS
and CSP. During registration, RS stores the values of ((P1)x,A,t) for all users. In
each registration session, CSP stores the values a = Q.r and d = A.r. Trent can
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determine the value of A used in a given authentication session by iterating through
RS ’s list and therefore identify the user.
Integrity and Attack Resistance
The proposed protocol is designed to guarantee the integrity of messages and protec-
tion against Man-in-the-Middle, eavesdropping, and replay attacks. This means that
the recipient of a message can be confident that it came from the alleged sender and
was not modified in transit.
Proof: The integrity of the protocol is dependent upon public key cryptography and
knowledge of values shared over a secure channel. When setting up a group, Trent
signs the group parameters using a private key whose public key was shared previously
with RS and CSP. For all future communications, RS and CSP encrypt the data
being sent using Trent’s public key so that only he can decrypt it. Therefore, the
integrity of all communications among RS, Trent, and CSP is guaranteed by public
key cryptography. Communications between Alice and RS are assumed to occur over
a secure channel and a failed session will result in Alice being unable to authenticate,
revealing any failures in integrity. Communications between Alice and CSP rely upon
information from these communications over a secure channel and a loss of integrity
will result in a failure to authenticate. These protections secure the protocol against
Man-in-the-Middle attacks and eavesdropping attacks.
The authentication stage of the protocol is protected against replay attacks due to
the fact that both Alice and CSP generate a random parameter to include in the au-
thentication calculation. An attacker that attempts to replay one side of the protocol
will cause a failed authentication since one of these random numbers will be different.
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This difference in random numbers will cause Eq. (3.19) not to hold true as c will
be calculated based upon the replayed value of RC while the CSP will be using the
new value of RC, hence causing the CSP to reject the authentication attempt.
Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks
Same as all existing authentication schemes, the proposed system is vulnerable to
DoS attacks due to the requirement for unlinkability. If requests could be linked,
the detection of a DoS attack would be trivial and the future connection attempts
from that user could be ignored. In order to identify an attacker and add them to a
revocation list in a scheme providing unlinkability, anonymity must be stripped away
from one or more users without being certain that their connection was part of the
attack (since they could be legitimately using the service while the attack is taking
place). Even if the attacker is added to the revocation list, several communications
must be performed before the CSP tests for revocation. Therefore, a DoS attack
attempting to tie up the CSP ’s resources by repeating only the pre-test phases is still
possible.
Traffic Analysis Attacks
We have used TOR to prevent the proposed protocol against traffic analysis attacks to
preserve the anonymity of the user. For anonymity a TOR client selects the nodes to
be used in circuits uniformly from the set of active routers so that the attacker cannot
influence the selection path. Normally, an adversary can modify the communication
in a variety of ways i.e., drop, alter, delay or add. However, for traffic analysis attacks,
we only consider an adversary who wants to learn the source or destination of the
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communication. TOR can be insecure against an adversary who can observe the
traffic as it enters and leaves the TOR network. In that case, the adversary needs
to have access to both entry and exit nodes to correlate the traffic by using traffic
analysis attack [102].
A method for path selection and specifying the degree of anonymity was proposed
by A. Panchenko et al. [103] using entropy based metric. In this method, a user can
be deanonymized if the attacker owns both the entry and exit nodes of the user’s
circuit. The entropy E(X) of a path selection metric and the corresponding degree











The number of the distinct entry and exit nodes combinations that occurred in the
sample of paths X are denoted by N in Eq. (3.25), whereas the corresponding
probability of the combination i is represented by pi. EMax used in Eq. (3.26) is
the maximum entropy that can occur. Using d = 1 in a path selection method will
choose any entry and exit nodes combination with the same probability. Hence, the
attacker has no influence in the path selection process.
While the potential exists for an attacker to defeat the security provided by the TOR
network in the proposed scheme, the result is that anonymity is lost due to factors
outside the control of the proposed protocol. Other protocols that do not implement
protections using TOR or similar products will be vulnerable to such attacks by
default.
Page 50
Section 3.3 Chapter 3
3.3.2 Complexity Analysis
In this section, we compare the complexity of the proposed scheme to several similar
schemes from the literature theoretically. In selecting protocols for comparison, we
used the criteria to narrow the selection of protocols :
• No devices are required by the protocol (smartcard and tamper-proof device).
• The protocol allows an unlimited number of authentications by a user without
compromising privacy.
Based on these criteria, the protocols selected for comparison are those by Djellalbia
et al. [71], Kuzhalvaimozhi and Rao [8], Li et al. [72], Lin et al. [15], Liu et al. [73], and
Sudarsono and Al Rasyid [19], which are referred to as Djellalbia, Kuzhalvaimozhi,
Li, Lin, Liu, and Sudarsono respectively in the following Tables.
Table A.2 compares the important features provided by the protocols studied. Sub-
scripts used in Table A.2 provide further information for some values and are ex-
plained as follows:
1. No revocation algorithm is specified that allows the Service Manager to report
abuse of services and terminate patients access.
2. The user information shared among the patient and the Registration and Ticket
Manager is never specified. It may be necessary to create a new user ID to
update credentials.
3. The GM can link user’s public keys to their identity and trivially link user
transactions together. Authors treat certificates as “pseudo-secret” since GM
may not be trusted.
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4. No use of public key infrastructure mentioned to protect communication in-
tegrity.
5. The patients “pseudo-identity"/private key is the hash of their true identity, a
new private key requires a new identity.
6. The authors claim unlinkability of their scheme; however, the pseudonym sent
to the Access Point is the same for each transaction and allows transactions to
be linked.
7. It is never specified whether a secure channel is used for registration. If not,
the protocol is vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle attack.
8. The GM knows every user’s secret key. A malicious GM could impersonate any
user.
9. The user’s ID is "embedded in the key". Depending on how this occurs, cre-
dential update may require the user to create a new ID every time.
10. Only the signer creates random values in the signing phase, an attacker could
replay a session with the same random values.
As shown in Table A.2, the proposed protocol is the only studied protocol that
provides all of the desired features and protection against attacks. The protocol that
comes closest is that of Li et al. [72], which lacks forward-unlinkability. It can be
seen in [72] that the pseudoidentity generated in registration is provided as a part of
authentication packets used, which makes the transactions trivially linkable. Also,
for several of the protocols listed, the issue of credential revocation is not explicitly
addressed.
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In addition to this, the proposed scheme provides a description of how to use the
TOR network to add a second layer of anonymity to the protocol. While all of
the studied protocols provide theoretical anonymity, it is possible for an attacker
monitoring network communications to trace packets back to users and therefore
reveal their identities outside of the bounds of the protocol. Use of the TOR network
is compatible with all of the protocols studied and is highly recommended in order
to ensure user anonymity at all levels.
Next, we compare proposed protocol with selected protocols from literature for com-
putational complexity. For each protocol, the four phases are decomposed into the
operations necessary to complete the phase for a single user. In Table A.3, m is used
to denote the total number of users of the system, α denotes the number of patients
assigned to a given physician, n is a variable set by the implementers of the protocol,
and r is the number of revoked users. The complexities of each protocol are shown
in Table A.3. The symbols used in the table refer to the following operations:
• KG: Generate public/private keypair
• ECA: Elliptic-Curve Addition
• ECD: Elliptic-Curve Division
• ECM: Elliptic-Curve Multiplication
• H: Hash Operation
• ES/DS: Symmetric Key Encryption/Decryption
• EA/DA: Asymmetric Key Encryption/Decryption
• EP : Evaluation of pairing function
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• E: Exponentiation
• EM : Modular Exponentiation
• PC : Calculation of prime number
In this analysis, the complexities of looking up public keys or certificates in a database
are not included as they are necessary to all of the described protocols and the
complexity depends upon implementation details.
In an anonymous authentication scheme, the complexity of the authentication phase
is the most significant as it is performed each time the user wishes to perform a
transaction. As shown in Table A.3, the proposed protocol’s authentication phase
is more efficient than those proposed by Djellalbia et al. (which requires a search
through all issued Authentication Tickets) [71], Lin et al. (which requires n + 1/n
identity based encryption operations) [15], and Sudarsono et al. (which requires r+7
Elliptic Curve Multiplications and r+9 evaluations of a pairing function as compared
to our values of r + 7 and 2 respectively) [19].
The proposed scheme is comparable to Li et al. [72] and that by Liu et al [73].
These two protocols do not have a clearly defined revocation algorithm. Logically,
it is impossible for a protocol to be unlinkable and not require performing some
operation on every value in the revocation list or contacting a trusted third party
during revocation. If the verifier could compute a value for each authentication and
check for that value in the revocation list, transactions could be linked by the values
computed. Therefore, tests for revocation must require at least r operations. This
makes our protocol’s authentication phase comparable in complexity to those of Li
et al. [72] and Liu et al. [73], since the primary difference between the complexity of
our authentication phase and theirs is the r Elliptic Curve Multiplications that we
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must perform in order to test if a user is on the revocation list.
Kuzhalvaimozhi and Rao’s [8] protocol has a lower complexity than ours in Authenti-
cation and claims to provide anonymity and unlinkability. However, the Group Man-
ager (GM) in their protocol can trivially de-anonymize a user and link transactions
together. The protocol treats information usable for linkability as "pseudo-secret"
since it could be shared by a corrupt or incompetent GM. Therefore, we do not
consider this protocol to provide unlinkability. Also, this scheme does not provide
credential revocation. These two shortcomings make the protocol unusable for our
targeted use case.
Table A.4 shows the execution times provided in [73], which can be used to estimate
the relative complexities of each protocol. One can see that the proposed protocol
is much faster than Sudarsono’s [19] protocol, which is the only other protocol that
provides unlinkability, in the initialization and authentication phases. However, it is
slower in the revocation phase as it treats CSP as an untrusted entity.
Then, we compare the studied protocols based upon the number of one-way commu-
nications necessary for each phase of the protocol. The results are shown in Table
A.5. The value t is a special parameter of Lin’s scheme [15] that denotes the num-
ber of patient records to be bundled in a single transmission from the database to
physicians. It is assumed for initialization that each publishing of a message requires
a single transmission.
As shown in Tables A.5 and A.6, it is difficult to compare the communication com-
plexities of the studied protocols without the knowledge of the revocation functions
used. The only other protocol with a clearly defined revocation procedure, Sudar-
sono’s protocol [19], requires fewer communications per phase than the proposed
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protocol. However, as shown in Table A.6, for the most commonly executed phase
(Authentication), the proposed protocol requires less than half the number of bits to
be communicated for the messages exchanged during the authentication phase. The
values used in Table A.6 were calculated based upon the following assumptions.
1. For all protocols, the group public key is transmitted as a part of Initialization.
2. Hash functions have 256-bit outputs.
3. 160-bit public keys are used for the calculations on elliptic curves.
4. Message authentication codes are calculated as a 256-bit HMAC (Hash Based
Message Authentication Code).
5. Identities when defined in protocols are stored as 32-bit values.
6. Each selection from a group of functions (hash, pairing, etc.) is stored as an
8-bit value.
7. The results of all exponentiations are stored as 256-bit values.
8. The generated random values are 32-bits.
9. Times and dates are stored as 64-bit values.
10. The result of a multiplication with a hash function output is stored in a 512-bit
value (unless it is an elliptic curve multiplication).
11. Encryption is performed with a 256-bit block cipher.
12. All textual messages are 1024 bits in length.
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3.4 Concluding Remarks
Protecting the identity privacy of a user is crucial to the success of smart Cloud based
healthcare applications. In this chapter, we have presented the anonymous authenti-
cation scheme for smart Cloud based healthcare applications. The proposed scheme
preserves the privacy of patients when they access the services hosted on the Cloud.
The proposed protocol utilizes rotating group signature scheme based on ECC. Due
to smaller key sizes used in ECC, the security of the system can be easily scaled up by
increasing the key size without affecting the computational complexity. The proposed
scheme adds an extra layer of protection against traffic analysis by employing TOR,
hence providing anonymity at the network layer. The scheme protects patients’ sen-
sitive data from an eavesdropper and untrusted Cloud servers. One salient feature of
our scheme is that the medical application or service providers cannot reveal the iden-
tity of the patient hence protecting the privacy. The proposed authentication scheme
ensures that the patients can consume services without revealing their identity at the
time of consumption or retrospectively
Page 57
Chapter 4
Location Privacy Protection for
Smart Health Care System
In this chapter, we propose a protection mechanism for location privacy for smart
health care system. The protection of location privacy is ensured without requiring
any trusted entities. In this scenario, we assume that a patient is fitted with body
sensors and a GPS module. Sensors send data to the Main Processing Unit (MPU)
attached to the patient. The MPU periodically send the necessary data to the hos-
pital (server). In the proposed mechanism patients need to predefine their private
locations which they do not want to disclose to anyone. These sensitive locations
are stored in their respective MPUs. In this work, an efficient and adaptive location
perturbation algorithm is used to create perturbed locations. The amount of pertur-
bation is determined by a proposed super Gaussian style 2-dimensional (2D) function
which is centered on the predefined sensitive locations. The proposed scheme guaran-
tees that the amount of perturbation added to the location data is dependent on how
far is the actual location from the predefined sensitive locations. For example, it will
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add more noise if it is closer to the sensitive location and vice versa. The proposed lo-
cation perturbation algorithm achieves location privacy while maintaining acceptable
location information accuracy for health care purposes. To objectively measure the
closeness of the actual path and the perturbed path, Hausdorff distance is used. The
experiment results show the effectiveness of the proposed location privacy protection
mechanism.
4.1 Introduction
We assume a smart health care system where sensors attached to a patient’s body to
regularly collect information such as heart rate, blood pressure, and body tempera-
ture. A GPS module is also attached to the patient. The outputs of the sensors and
the current location information from the GPS module are sent to the MPU which
has the ability to process the received data and send the necessary information to
the hospital server.
In this system, we realistically assume that the MPU has necessary data and pro-
cessing ability to decide whether the patient is in a critical state or not. When the
patient is not in an emergency or a life threatening situation, MPU periodically (i.e.,
at regular time intervals) send the location information of the patient to the hospital
via an encrypted channel with a pseudonym representing the patient. The patient
and his pseudonym are only known to patient himself and the hospital.
In non-emergency situations, the hospital collects the location information of patient
periodically and stores to its database. We assume that this information is used for
such as to understand his lifestyle changes and pollutants or virus infections reported
in the areas visited by the patient. For this purpose, hospitals do not need precise
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location of the patient. However, to receive better health care it is advisable to send
as more accurate location information as possible to the hospital. It is assumed that,
in our proposed model, patients are only concerned about their sensitive locations.
In most of the location based systems users send location information directly or
indirectly to un-trusted LBSs and they mainly require their privacy to be protected
from their LBSs. However, in the proposed model patients are assumed to be not
much worried about hospitals knowing their locations except their sensitive locations.
In other words, no one should be able to relate a patient’s sensitive locations with
the patient.
4.2 Proposed mechanism
In this section, we present the system overview, provide the threat model and discuss
the proposed scheme in detail.
4.2.1 System overview
In this work, we assume a smart health care system where sensors attached to a
patient’s body to regularly collect information such as heart rate, blood pressure,
and body temperature. A GPS module is also attached to the patient. The outputs
of the sensors and the current location information from the GPS module are sent
to the MPU which has the ability to process the received data and send necessary
information to the hospital server.
In this system we realistically assume that the MPU has necessary data and processing
ability to decide whether the patient is in a critical state or not. When the patient
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is not in emergency or a life threatening situation, MPU periodically (i.e., at regular
time intervals) send the location information of the patient to the hospital via an
encrypted channel with a pseudonym representing the patient. The patient and his
pseudonym are only know to patient himself and the hospital.
In non-emergency situations, the hospital collects the location information of patient
periodically and stores in its database. We assume that this information is used for
purposes such as to understand his lifestyle changes and pollutants or virus infections
reported in the areas visited by the patient. For this purpose hospitals do not need
precise location of the patient. However, to receive better health care it is advisable to
send as more accurate location information as possible to the hospital. It is assumed
that, in our system model, patients are only concerned about their sensitive locations.
In most of the location based systems users send location information directly or
indirectly to un-trusted LBSs and they mainly require their privacy to be protected
from their LBSs. However, in the proposed model patients are assumed to be not
much worried about hospitals knowing their locations except their sensitive locations.
In other words, no one should be able to relate a patient’s sensitive locations with
the patient.
Basic Notation
In this sub-section, we discuss how to define location coordinates of a patient and
define locations he considered to be sensitive.
Definition 1 (Location information) Actual location information of a patient is
represented by geographic coordinates Ti = (xi, yi), where subscript i denotes the
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time index. Let us assume i = 1, 2, ..., n. We also define,
Ti = (xi, yi) ∈ S, (4.1)
where S denotes a larger geographic area under consideration, such as a country or
a state. Thus the actual trajectory of the patient T is give by
T = {(x1, y1), (x2, y2), ..., (xi, yi), ..., (xn, yn)}
= {T1, T2, ..., Ti, ..., Tn} . (4.2)
Definition 2 (Sensitive location) The sensitive location, which the patient does
not want directly or indirectly reveal to any entity is denoted by Ij = (x̂j, ŷj where
position index j = 1, 2, ...,m. We realistically assume that n m. We also define T̂
as
I = {(x̂1, ŷ1), (x̂2, ŷ2), ..., (x̂j, ŷj), ..., (x̂m, ŷm)}
= {I1, I2, ..., Ij, ..., Im} . (4.3)
Definition 3 (Perturbed location) Perturbed location information of a patient
is represented by geographic coordinates T ′ = (x′i, y′i), where subscript i denotes the
time index and i = 1, 2, ..., n. The location (x′i, y′i) is the perturbed counterpart of
the actual location (xi, yi). We also define,
T ′ = (x′i, y
′
i) ∈ S. (4.4)
The perturbed trajectory of the patient T ′ is give by
T ′ = {(x′1, y′1), (x′2, y′2), ..., (x′i, y′i), ..., (x′n, y′n)}
= {T ′1, T ′2, ..., T ′i , ..., T ′n} . (4.5)
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Privacy and accuracy measure
In the context of this chapter, location privacy is the inability to get the users actual
location (xi, yi) from the perturbed location (x′i, y′i). The distance between the actual
location and the perturbed location determines the level of privacy and accuracy.
The level of privacy increases with the distance while location accuracy decreases
with the distance. To measure the level of privacy and accuracy we use Hausdorff
Distance and Modified Euclidean Distance which are defined as follows.
• Hausdorff Distance:In order to objectively measure the maximum separation
between the actual locations and the perturbed locations we use Hausdorff
Distance (HD). HD measures how far two subsets of a metric space are from
each other. We define HD between trajectories T and T ′ as













i ) }, (4.6)
where sup represents the supremum, inf the infimum and d(Ti, T ′i ) returns the
distance between the points Ti and T ′i .
Smaller HD values indicate that the actual trajectory and the trajectory based
on perturbed locations are closer. Thus the smaller HD value denotes lower
privacy and higher location accuracy while the higher HD value denotes the
opposite.
• Modified Euclidean distance: Euclidean distance is defined as straight-
line distance between two points in Euclidean space. In order to measure the
closeness of actual locations (xi, yi)s and the perturbed locations (x′i, y′i)s, we
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define the Modified Euclidean Distance (EDM) as follows
EDM =
∑n





Higher EDM indicates higher privacy (correspondingly lower accuracy) and
lower EDM value indicates lower privacy (correspondingly higher accuracy).
4.2.2 Threat model
The main aim of the proposed location protection mechanism is to generate dummy
locations in such a way that no adversary (including the hospital staff) should know
about the patient’s sensitive locations.
Weak adversary: The weak adversary has limited information about the locations
of the patient. For example, a weak adversary can be an eavesdropper who occasion-
ally intercepts the communication between the patient and the hospital.
It is relatively easy to protect the location privacy from a weak adversary. An en-
crypted and secure communication channel and/or a simple perturbation to the actual
location can protect the location privacy from this adversary. For additional privacy,
the amount of perturbation can be increased when the actual location is one of those
sensitive locations.
Strong adversary: The strong adversary has access to all location information
reported to the hospital. A typical example of a strong adversary is a hacker who
has access to the hospital system.
A simple perturbation technique is insufficient to protect the patient’s location pri-
vacy against this adversary. As strong adversary has access to several location infor-
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mation, an adversary may predict a sensitive location by tracing the trajectory of the
patient. Thus a sophisticated location perturbation technique is necessary to hide
sensitive locations from a strong adversary.
4.2.3 Proposed algorithm
In determining the level of privacy and accuracy of the location data, the distance
between the perturbed location (T ′i ) and the corresponding actual location (Ti) plays






(x′i − xi)2 + (y′i − yi)2
} 1
2 . (4.8)
A higher ri value increases the security of location privacy while decreases the ac-
curacy of the location data. To achieve a higher security of location privacy and
maintain accuracy in the proposed mechanism, ri is adaptively changed by consid-
ering the distance between the current location and the sensitive locations. That is,
ri should take higher values when the current location is closer to sensitive locations
(Ijs) and ri should take lower values when the current location is away from sensitive
locations.
To ensure privacy and accuracy are within a range we define the maximum for each
ri value as rmi . This rmi varies based on the closeness of the sensitive locations. We
also define upper and lower boundaries for rmi as rU and rL, respectively. When the
current location is a sensitive location (i.e., Ti = Ij), rmi = rU . Similarly, rmi = rL
when Ti is far away from sensitive locations.
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The manner in which rmi changes influence privacy and accuracy. To change rmi in an









where exp{·} denotes an exponential function, parameters k1 and k2 are positive
integers. The function fi,j has its center at (x̂j, ŷj) and fi,j ∈ [0, 1]. The influence
indicator function fi,j indicates the influence of a sensitive location Ij = (x̂j, ŷj) at
the location Ti = (xi, yi). While fi,j takes its maximum value of “1” when the current
location is the same as the sensitive location (i.e., Ti = Ij), fi,j takes its lowest value
of “0” when the current location is far away from the sensitive location.
From Equation (4.9) we can clearly see the importance of parameters k1 and k2 in
determining the sensitive location influence variation. Fig. 4.1, shows how fi,j varies
with parameter k1 where k2 is arbitrarily set to a fix value. From Fig. 4.1 we can also
see that a higher k1 value results very high influence of the sensitive location in the
area surrounding it (i.e., very high influence near Ij). Fig. 4.2, depicts variation of
fi,j against parameter k2, where k1 remains constant. One can clearly see from Fig.
4.2 that the sensitive location influence decreases gradually with increasing k2 value
and with smaller values of k2 influence suddenly decreases. This implies that higher
values of k2 should be used for patients who are more concerned about their location
privacy.
To find the value of rmi for given sensitive locations Ijs, we formulate
rmi = rL + max{fi,1, fi,2, ..., fi,m} × (rU − rL), (4.10)
where function max{·} returns the maximum value of its arguments. Fig. 4.3
shows the variation of rmi for an area where there are three arbitrarily chosen sen-
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Figure 4.2: Variation of fi,j with parameter k2. (a) k2 = 40000, (b) k2 = 10000, (c)
k2 = 2500.
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sitive locations are present (i.e., m=3). From eq. (4.10), it is obvious that when
max{fi,1, fi,2, ..., fi,m} returns its highest value of “1”, rmi = rU and when when














Figure 4.3: Example of rmi Variation where there are Three Sensitive Locations.
The traditional approach of generating a perturbed or dummy location T ′i corre-
sponding to the actual location Ti is to randomly choose a location from a circle of
area with the radius of rmi and centered at the actual location (xi, yi). In this ap-
proach probability of having a dummy location within radius of ri increases with ri
as shown in Fig. 4.4. In Fig. 4.4, vertical axis denotes the probability of having the
dummy location within the radius ri. From Fig. 4.4 we can see that there is always a
possibility that T ′i (perturbed location) can be very closer to Ti (sensitive location).
This approach has a major problem in our application scenario, because a patient
does not want to send his/her sensitive location to the hospital.
To overcome this problem, we propose an approach in which dummy location is
created within the area between two concentric circles centered at (xi, yi) and with
the radiuses of rmi and (p.rmi ), where p ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter (i.e., rmi > (p.rmi )). We
call the circle area with the radius (p.rmi ) as “empty zone” as that region does not
Page 68



















Figure 4.4: Probability of having a Dummy Location within Radius of ri.
contain any dummy locations. This approach guarantees that no dummy location
is created with ri less than (p.rmi ). In Fig. 4.5 possible dummy location generation
areas for both traditional approach and the proposed approach are shown by shaded
regions. It is noteworthy to mention here that, when the current location is closer to
a sensitive location, the empty zone increases as rmi , thus the radius (p.rmi ) increases.
This provides better privacy protection to the patient when the patient is closer to a
sensitive location.
Figure 4.5: Possible Dummy Location Generation Areas.
When we generate perturbed locations based on the above mentioned approach, it
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is possible to get an unusual perturbed location based trajectory such as the one
shown in Fig. 4.6. Clearly, this perturbed location based trajectory shows a very
unusual behavior and can alert an adversary. To solve this problem, we further
modify the possible area where a dummy location can be generated by considering the
current actual location (xi, yi) and the next actual location (xi+1, yi+1). To facilitate
this, we alter the proposed approach such that patient will report the perturbed
location T ′i = (x′i, y′i) when he/she is in the next actual location Ti+1 = (xi+1, yi+1).
This time delayed approach not only facilitates more unsuspicious dummy location
generation, but also gives additional real time privacy protection regarding his/her
current location.
Figure 4.6: An Example of Actual (denoted by solid arrow lines) and Perturbed
(denoted by dashed arrow lines) Trajectories.
In the first stage of this enhanced dummy location generation mechanism, the area
(say A1) between two concentric circles centered at Ti = (xi, yi) and with the radiuses
of rmi determined as in the original proposed approach. In the next stage, a circle
sector (i.e., the area of a circle enclosed by two radii and an arc) is defined for the
outer circle (i.e., the circle with the radius rmi ). We denote this area as A2 and call the
central angel 2θs, where we refer θs(< 1800) as “angle of swing”. This circle sector is
Page 70
Section 4.2 Chapter 4
oriented in such a way the circle sector’s axis of symmetry overlaps with the straight
line connecting locations Ti = (xi, yi) and Ti+1 = (xi+1, yi+1). In this enhanced ver-
sion, dummy location is generated from the area where areas A1 and A2 are overlap.
Fig. 4.7 shows an example of an area where a dummy location can be generated using
the enhanced version of the dummy location generation approach. Fig. 4.8 shows
how the perturbed location based trajectory shown in Fig. 4.6 improves when the
enhanced approach is used.
Figure 4.7: Enhanced Dummy Location Generation Area.
Figure 4.8: An Example of Actual (denoted by solid arrow lines) and Enhanced
Perturbed (denoted by dashed arrow lines) Trajectories.
It should be noted that a lower θs ensures a more realistic perturbed location based
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trajectory. However, the lower θs also brings actual and perturbed trajectories closer
together. Thus, depending on the patient’s requirement, value of θs should be chosen
differently. Furthermore, we can clearly see that in the enhanced approach, distance
between two successive perturbed locations (i.e., the distance between T ′i and T ′i+1)
is more closer to the distance between their actual location counterparts. This makes
the perturbed location based path less suspicious for an adversary.
The proposed location perturbation mechanism is presented in Algorithm D.1. From
Algorithm D.1, we can observe that the dummy location corresponds to the previ-
ous location ( T ′i = (x′i, y′i)) is sent to the hospital when the patient is in location
Ti+1(xi+1, yi+1).
Fig. 4.9 shows an example of a trajectory based on the perturbed locations created
by the proposed algorithm.
Figure 4.9: Illustrative Diagram which shows an example of Actual (denoted by solid
arrow lines) and Enhanced Perturbed (denoted by dashed arrow lines) Trajectories.
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4.3 Experimental Setup and Scheme Evaluation
In this section, the effectiveness of our proposed location protection mechanism is
experimentally evaluated by simulations. The simulations are performed using MAT-
LAB in an HP notebook computer with Intel Core i7-4700 MQ (2.4 GHz) processor,
16 GB RAM, and Windows 10 operating system.
In the first part of the simulations, we compare the actual trajectory of a patient
with perturbed trajectory created by the proposed mechanism and the perturbed
trajectory created by the traditional mechanism. In the traditional mechanism, we
consider rmi to be a constant value and p = 0. In other words, there is no concept
of “empty zone” in traditional approach. In our method, the simulation parameters
are: rU = 120, rL = 40, k1 = 2, k2 = 5000, θs = 450, p = 0.8, n = 10 and m = 2. We
randomly created the actual trajectory of the patient. We assume that the patient
moves with the constant speed of 100 unit distances per unit time. For the illustrative
purposes, we consider that our time unit is small enough so that the patient moves
in a straight line within a unit time. Based on these assumptions we can summarize
the simulation conditions as follows.
• Unit time: Time taken for the patient to travel from location Ti = (xi, yi) to
Ti+1 = (xi+1, yi+1). This is the smallest time scale in our simulations.
• Unit distance: This is the smallest distance we can measure in our simulations.
We assume that within one unit time the patient travels in a straight line 100
unit distances. That is, {(xi+1 − xi)2 + (yi+1 − yi)2}
1
2 = 100 unit distances.
• Number of locations in a trajectory: In the simulations we consider the patient
travels 10 locations per journey. In other words, his actual and perturbed tra-
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jectory contain 10 locations (i.e., n = 10). These actual locations of the patients
(i.e, T1, T2, ..., T10) are randomly created and corresponding perturbed locations
are generated by the proposed mechanism and the traditional mechanism.
• Number of sensitive locations: In the simulations, two sensitive locations are
created in a random manner (i.e., m = 2 and I = {I1, I2}). In order to highlight
the effectiveness of the proposed approach, we consider that in all the simula-
tions the patient visited one of the sensitive locations and visited a location
which is closer to the other sensitive location.
Fig. 4.10 (a)-(h) shows actual, proposed perturbed, and the traditional perturbed
trajectories of the patient in a Cartesian coordinate system that specifies each location
uniquely in an area by a pair of “x” and “y” coordinates. From 4.10 (a)-(h) one can see
that when the patient travels to a sensitive location or he travels closer to a sensitive
location, the trajectories generated by the proposed approach is far away from the
sensitive locations. On the other hand, the trajectories generated by the traditional
approach is closer to the sensitive locations. It is important to note here that the
main goal of the proposed perturbed location generation Algorithm D.1 is to ensure
that no adversary should directly or indirectly know about that sensitive locations of
the patient. From Fig. 4.10 (a)-(n), one can see that by analyzing the trajectories
generated by the proposed approach, it is not possible for an adversary to know
about a patient’s sensitive locations. This effectiveness of the proposed perturbed
mechanism in generating perturbed locations.
In the second part of the simulations, we compare the closeness of the perturbed
trajectory generated by the proposed approach with the actual trajectory. We in-
vesting the closeness with respect to the parameters rL, rU , θs, and p. While a higher
closeness measure implies a higher accuracy and a lower closeness measure indicates
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Figure 4.10: Actual Trajectory verses Trajectories Produced by Proposed Approach
and Traditional Approach.
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a higher level of privacy. To objectively measure the closeness of the trajectories we
use Hausdorff distance (HD) and Modified Euclidian Distance (EDM). To get reliable
results, we calculated the average HD and EDM values for 20000 independent runs
in each considered scenario.
It is worthy to mention that in the context of this system model, an effectively HD
measures the closeness of the sensitive points to the nearest perturbed location as
sensitive locations are the furthest locations to the actual locations in the proposed
approach. In other words, a higher HD refers to a higher level of privacy for sensitive
locations. On the other hand, EDM measures the overall closeness of the perturbed
locations with corresponding actual locations.
Table B.1 shows HD and EDM values for different rL values along with their respective
standard deviations denoted by σHD and σEDM . From Table B.1 we can see, under all
conditions, both HD and EDM values increase with increasing rL value as expected.
However, compared to the rise in HD values, EDM value dramatically increases with
increasing rL values. This indicates that the value of rL significantly influences the
overall privacy compared to the privacy of the sensitive locations. Even though the
angle of deviation θs influences the shape of the trajectory, it is clear from Table B.1
that the change of θs value does not have significant influence in the HD and EDM
values. Table B.1 shows that when p value changed from 0.8 to 0.4, both HD and
EDM values considerably decreases. This implies that lower p values decrease the
privacy as perturbed locations can be generated closer to the actual locations. Thus,
for the patients who prefer to have a higher level of privacy, p value closer to “1”
should be used. We can see from Table B.1 that the standard deviation of HD values
decreases with rL while the standard deviation of EDM values increases with rL.
HD and EDM values for different rU values and their corresponding standard devi-
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ations are shown in Table B.2. It is very clear from Table B.2 that both HD and
EDM values increase with increasing rU value. Also, with increasing rL values, HD
values increases rapidly compared with EDM values. This implies that the value of rU
greatly affects the privacy of the sensitive locations. Similar to Table B.1, θs value in
Table B.2 does affects the privacy of the proposed approach. In Table B.2, regardless
of the ru value, both HD and EDM values considerably decreases with decreasing p
value. Unlike the scenario in Table B.1, in Table B.2 the standard deviation increases
with rU for both HD and EDM measures.
4.4 Concluding Remarks
We have presented a new location privacy protection mechanism for smart health
system. The core of this proposed mechanism is the novel perturbed location gener-
ation algorithm, which ensures the protection of location privacy while maintaining
the required level of accuracy. The main aim of proposed mechanism is to ensure that
no adversary can relate a patient with his/her sensitive locations by accessing and/or
analyzing his location information which is sent from his MPU. This is achieved in
the proposed approach via adaptively changing the amount of location perturbation
by considering how far the actual location is from the sensitive locations. In addition
to this, to guarantee that a perturbed location is not generated closer to an actual
location even by chance. We introduced an “empty zone” around actual locations
such that no perturbed locations can be created in that zone. Moreover, we proposed
an enhanced technique to generate perturbed locations by considering the patients
direction of travel to make sure that the perturbed location based trajectory does
not look suspicious to an adversary.
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Efficient and Privacy Preserving
Clustering for Spatiotemporal Data
This chapter presents an efficient and privacy preserving clustering algorithm for spa-
tiotemporal data. Many clustering techniques have been proposed for data analysis
applications. However, applying those techniques to spatiotemporal data clustering
is still in its infancy. The efficiency of a spatiotemporal data analysis algorithm will
sharply decline as the data increase. We tackle the issue of clustering spatiotemporal
data on public Cloud based on the distance between them. To increase the efficiency
of spatiotemporal clustering, we have proposed a MapReduce based framework for
clustering. However, as spatiotemporal dataset contains sensitive information, di-
rectly outsourcing spatiotemporal data to Cloud servers will raise privacy concerns.
The proposed scheme allows Cloud server to perform clustering operation directly on
encrypted spatiotemporal data. Extensive experimental evaluation with trajectory
data shows that our scheme efficiently produces higher quality clustering results.
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5.1 Introduction
The choice of the clustering method depends on the application under consideration.
In our case, we have to choose a clustering method which suits well to trajectory
data. The nature of trajectory data such as different lengths and different sampling
rate, complicates the choice of selecting a clustering method. For instance, the most
popular clustering techniques like k-mean and c-mean cannot be applied in our case
because calculating the mean for trajectories with different length is trivial [93].
Hierarchical clustering methods are also not suitable for our case because of the non-
iterative nature of such clustering algorithms where they may not guarantee the best
partition for large scale datasets.
K-medoid is the best choice for clustering trajectory objects of different lengths. In
contrast to k-mean and c-mean, k-medoids choose data points (e.g, a trajectory) as
cluster center [93].
5.1.1 System Model
The goal of this study is to organize trajectories into groups where each of groups
contains trajectories with similar properties such as, shape and direction. The single
trajectory is represented by geographic coordinates Ti = (xi, yi), where xi and yi
denote the latitude and longitude respectively and subscript i denotes the time index
i.e., i = 1, 2, ..., N . We also define,
Ti = (xi, yi) ∈ R, (5.1)
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thus the trajectory T can be denoted by
T = {(x1, y1), (x2, y2), ..., (xi, yi), ..., (xN , yN)}
= {T1, T2, ..., Ti, ..., TN} . (5.2)
In our design, we consider a system model where a data owner has outsourced the
collection of spatiotemporal data to the Cloud server for clustering. To protect the
sensitive information, the data objects are encrypted before they are shared on the
Cloud server, where they will perform the clustering over the encrypted dataset. The
system framework is shown in Fig.5.1.
Figure 5.1: System Framework.
5.1.2 Threat Model
In this chapter, we considered the Cloud server is honest but curious which means
that the Cloud server will follow the designed protocol as well as try to learn as
much as possible from the dataset and the intermediate output. We considered two
different threat models for the protection of spatiotemporal data.
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• Ciphertext Only Model: In ciphertext only model, the Cloud server has access
to all the encrypted datasets, and intermediate results.
• Known Background Model: In known background model, the Cloud server
may have some background information or access to a small portion of an
unencrypted dataset in addition to the encrypted datasets and intermediate
results.
In our scheme, we should prevent the Cloud server and malicious adversaries from
learning any data object and cluster centers outsourced by the data owner.
5.1.3 Preprocessing
In order to increase the efficiency of the proposed scheme, we have applied some
preprocessing on the dataset.
Trajectory Simplification
To reduce the redundant data points, we have applied the trajectory simplification
algorithm [104] to increase the performance.
Transformation
All the points of input trajectories are defined in the geographic coordinate system
(i.e., Latitude and longitude). In order to perform the distance computations, we have
to convert (project) them first into a Cartesian coordinate system. The conversion is
performed as follows:
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• Determine the geographic coordinates of the west-most longitude (MinLongitude)
for all input trajectories.
• Determine the geographic coordinates of the east-most longitude (MaxLongitude)
for all input trajectories.
• Determine Longitude span (Z = MaxLongitude−MinLongitude).
• Determine the geographic coordinates of the north-most latitude (MaxLatitude)
for all input trajectories.
• Determine the geographic coordinates of the south-most latitude (MinLatitude)
for all input trajectories.
• Determine Longitude span (C = MaxLatitude−MinLatitude)
• Now, given a Latitude (lat) and Longitude (lon), we want to convert (project)
it to the Cartesian coordinate, which is done as follows:
XPixel = ((MaxLongitude− lon)/(Z))× F
Y Pixel = ((MaxLatitude− lat)/(C))× F
where F is a suitable factor that represents the ratio between the number points
in the span of the Cartesian coordinate to the number of latitudes/longitudes
in the span of the geographic coordinates.
5.2 Privacy Preserving Clustering of Trajectory Data
In this section, we construct the privacy preserving clustering for spatiotemporal
data. We first introduce the new distance metric to measure the similarity between
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trajectories, then we design a distributed clustering algorithm for spatiotemporal
data. In the end, we will design a privacy preserving MapReduce based clustering
algorithm.
5.2.1 Similarity Measure
To measure the similarity between two spatiotemporal objects, we need to define a
distance function to qualify the similarity between two spatiotemporal objects. The
distance measure between trajectories is not standardized yet and may vary with
applications under considerations. We will use the definition established in [49] as a
reference. The dissimilarity between two trajectories T1 and T2 can be measured by
a function d : T1 × T2 → R, where T1, T2 ∈ T [49].
We aim to cluster the trajectories into group with similar behavior. Our specific goal
is to regroup the trajectories with the following behaviors:
• Trajectories with homogeneous features such as shape and length
• Trajectories close to each other and have similar direction
To measure the distance between a trajectory pair, we proposed a distance measure
based on Chamfer distance. We introduce the algorithm statement of the Chamfer
distance in Algorithm E.1.
Whereas, the distance transform of a trajectory T , in Algorithm E.1, is a matrix
in which, the value at every location in the matrix represents the distance between
this location and the closest point on the trajectory. Therefore, the distance trans-
form plays an important role in the computational efficiency of the Chamfer distance
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because it pre-computes the minimum distances which save huge computations. Al-
gorithm E.2 illustrates the distance transform computation.
The Algorithm E.1 measures the similarity between two trajectories, however, it
does not take into account the direction of the trajectories. The algorithm may
cluster two trajectories that are spatially close into the same cluster which sometimes
is not desirable. We also want to take the direction of trajectories into account
while regrouping them into clusters. To measure the similarity between a trajectory
pair, we propose the directional Chamfer distance [105] between the two trajectories
as a similarity measure in Algorithm E.3. The distance transform is also used for
computing the directional Chamfer distance, however, in this case the value at every
location in the matrix represents the direction of the reference trajectory at a point
that is closest to this location.
In Algorithm E.3, λ is the weight factor for direction. Whereas, the direction between







Another desirable property of the distance measure mentioned in [49] is symmetry
(i.e., d(Ta, Tb) = d(Tb, Ta)). The proposed directional Chamfer distance is not sym-
metric. To make the distance symmetric we can calculate the distance between two




(d(Ta, Tb) + d(Tb, Ta)). (5.4)
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5.2.2 Clustering using MapReduce
Due to technological advancements, data are generated at a much faster speed. This
makes clustering a challenging task. To increase the efficiency of the clustering we
used MapReduce.
MapReduce systematizes a generic “recipe” for handling large datasets that comprise
of two phases. In the primary stage, a user determines whether the computation
is applied over all input records in a dataset. These operations occur in parallel
and produce intermediate results. The intermediate results are then aggregated by
another user specified computation in the secondary stage.
The job in MapReduce starts with the data being stored on the underlying distributed
file system organized by key-value pairs which are a set of two linked data items. A
key is a unique identifier for the data element and the value is the data identified.
The arbitrary number of intermediate key-value pairs are generated by applying the
mapper on the input. The reducer is applied to all values associated with the same
intermediate key to generate the key-value pairs. The intermediate data is sorted by
the key and the final key-value pairs from each reducer and written back onto the
distributed file system whereas intermediate key-value pairs are discarded.
We use K-Medoids algorithm for clustering. We first device an algorithm to be
computed on the single node and then we modify that based on MapReduce. The
K-Medoids clustering algorithm on a single node is shown in Algorithm E.4. The
inputs to the algorithm is the number of required clustersK and the set of trajectories
T = {T1, . . . , TL}. The outputs of the K-Medoids algorithm are as follows
1. Vector of medoids M ∈ R1×K (cluster centers), where M [i] ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L} is
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the index of a trajectory considered as exemplar trajectory T exi for cluster i
2. A cluster membership vector C ∈ R1×L, where C[i] ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K} is the cluster
index of the trajectory Ti. In other words, after clustering, every cluster Ci has
an exemplar trajectory T exi called medoid and each trajectory is assigned a label
from the label set {1, 2, . . . , K}
To perform the clustering using MapReduce for a large number of trajectories, we
split the input trajectories to multiple folds and perform the clustering algorithm on
each fold separately as shown in Algorithm E.5.
In Algorithm E.5, we use the MapReduce framework as follows:
1. Mapper is used to evaluate the nearest cluster center for every trajectory and
generate a key-value pair consisting of the index of the nearest cluster center
as a key and the input of the trajectory as a string value.
2. Reducer is used to obtain the cluster membership. Specifically, the reducer
aggregates (adds) all string values associated with the same intermediate key
(cluster center) and emits a key-value pair consisting of the intermediate key
as a key and a comma-separated string (contains the indices of trajectories
associated with the key) as a string value.
3. Mapper-reducer paradigm is used again to update the centers of clusters. Specif-
ically, for every trajectory in a cluster, the mapper computes the distance be-
tween the trajectory and all other trajectory in that cluster. Then, the reducer
adds the computed distances to get the total distance between the trajectory
and all other trajectories in the cluster. The trajectory with the minimum
distance is selected as the new cluster center.
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The above process is repeated until there are no changes in the cluster centers.
5.2.3 Privacy Preserving Clustering
To protect the sensitive data before sending them to the Cloud for processing we
have used the scheme proposed by [38] based on Learn with Error (LWE) hard prob-
lem [106]. To encrypt the points of every trajectory before sending them to the Cloud
for performing clustering operation. The main computation before performing clus-
tering is the distance computation between every pair of trajectories which built on
computing the distance between a pair of points. In the following, we present the
homomorphic encryption on point pair and illustrate how the distance between two
encrypted points can be computed.
Given two points d1 = (x1, y1) and d2 = (x2, y2) where1 d1, d2 ∈ Z2p. We perform the
following steps:
1. Generate a random number r1 ∈ Zp.











4. Generate two random vectors e1 and e2, where e1, e2 ∈ Z4p.
Then, we encrypt d1 and d2 as
Eref(d1) = (Γd
e
1 + e1)×M (5.5)
Etgt(d2) = M
−1 × (Γde2 + eT2 ) (5.6)
1Note that Zp = {0, 1, . . . , p− 1} is a set of integers from 0 to p− 1.
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where M is a random 4 × 4 matrix, and Γ >> p is a very large number. Note that
(M, e1, e2) is the secrete key of the encryption. Now the distance D(d1, d2) can be























= (x1 − x2)2 + (y1 − y2)2 + ε,
≈ (x1 − x2)2 + (y1 − y2)2




is very small because Γ is very large.
Each point in the trajectory is encrypted in two ways as shown in Equation 5.5
and Equation 5.6. Additionally, we obtain the trajectory direction of each point
and encrypt it using the same equations (but d is one-dimensional in this case).
Specifically, for every point di in a trajectory, we compute the direction ai at that
point and convert both di and ai to an encrypted vector
E(di) = [Eref(di), Etgt(di), r
d
i , Eref(ai), Etgt(ai), r
a
i ]. (5.8)
We use the same algorithm for map-reduce implementation as in Algorithm E.5, but
with two main differences. First, the input to the algorithm is encrypted trajectories
dataset instead of the plain one. Second, the computations of directional Chamfer
distance in both functions GetNearestCenter and GetNewCenter in Algorithm E.5
are performed directly on the encrypted trajectories. Algorithm E.6 is used to com-
pute the directional Chamfer distance on encrypted trajectories.
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5.3 Scheme Evaluation
In this section, we will examine our scheme in terms of security, computational cost,
and communication overhead. We will also compare the efficiency of the proposed
scheme against simple K-medoids algorithm.
5.3.1 Experimental Setup
We perform the clustering on Google Cloud platform. The Cloud platform includes
one master node responsible for coordinating the parallel processing of data in Mapre-
duce and 6 worker nodes responsible for computations based on the instructions from
master node, each with 2.3 GHz Intel Xeon E5 v3 (Haswell) CPU, 6.5 GB memory
and runs Debian Linux 8.10 (Jessie). We have used two different datasets to con-
ducts our experiments [107, 108]. In particular, we have selected 2280 trajectories
from Dataset-I [107] and 2400 trajectories from Dataset-II [108].
5.3.2 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of our proposed scheme under the attack
models described in Section 5.1.2. Our scheme provides privacy protection up to some
extent even before applying the encryption on the dataset. As the trajectories are
preprocessed according to the discussion in Section 5.1.3, the preprocessing basically
perturb the data before applying any clustering operations. However, such a solution
only provides limited privacy guarantee under the Known Background Model. If an
adversary has access to small set of unencrypted data in the dataset, he can recover
the rest of objects [109]. Therefore, to provide strong privacy guarantee we have
Page 89
Section 5.3 Chapter 5
to utilize the strong cryptographic primitives [38] which is based on the hardness
assumption of the LWE problem [106]. It guarantees that the adversary won’t able
to recover any data from the ciphertexts.
We prove the security of the used encryption scheme based on the hardness assump-
tion discussed in [38] as follows : Given polynomially many samples ai, bi with
bi = D × ai + γi,
where the error term γi is drawn from some probability distribution, such as it is
computationally in-feasible to recover D with non-negligible probability.
In the used encryption scheme, each extended Di is encrypted as
E(Di) = (Γ.Di + ei)×M,
where the multiplication with the 2m × 2m matrix M can be considered as 2m dot
products of 2m-dimensional vectors as
E(Di)(1) = Γ.Di ×M(1) + ei ×M(1),
E(Di)(2) = Γ.Di ×M(2) + ei ×M(2),
. . . . . . ,
E(Di)(2m) = Γ.Di ×M(2m) + ei ×M(2m),
where E(Di)(j) is the jth element of E(Di) andM(j) is the jth element ofM . By de-
noting Γ.M(j) asM ′(j) and ei×M(j) as e′i(j), we have 2m samples (M ′(j), E(Di)(j))
with
E(Di)(j) = Di ×M ′(j) + e′i.
Therefore, recovering Di from the ciphertext E(Di) is a hard problem according to
the hardness assumption mentioned above. In Table C.4, we have randomly selected
Page 90
Section 5.3 Chapter 5
two subsets of trajectories, each containing 15 trajectories. We computed the distance
between ith trajectory in the first set and the ith trajectory in the second set with
encryption and without encryption. The last column in the table is the percentage of
a distance relative error between the computed distance using encryption and without




As shown from Table C.4, we can see that the percentage of the relative error is
negligible after computing the distance between trajectories in encrypted domain.
Hence, it can be concluded that the results of the clustering performed directly on
encrypted data on Cloud are very similar to the results performed without encryption,
therefore, it can be concluded that we can achieve the same clustering result without
compromising the privacy.
5.3.3 Clustering Accuracy
The aim of any clustering algorithm is to group data into homogeneous clusters
which are far from one another. One way to evaluate the clustering accuracy is by
looking at the variance between and within the different clustering groups. We want
the variance between the different clustering groups to be as far as possible from
one another and variance within a group to be as less as possible. To measure the
clustering accuracy we used Between-Like (BC) and the Within-Like (WC) criteria
which can be calculated as follows [93]:
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D(T exk , Ti) (5.11)
Table C.1 shows the values ofBC andWC for different k values and the corresponding
graph is shown in Fig. 5.2.
For both datasets (i.e., Dataset-I and Dataset-II), It can be seen in Fig. 5.2 that the
values of BC are far apart from each other among different clusters and the values
of WC is negligible within the same group as desired. Hence, it can be said that the
proposed clustering algorithm is producing accurate clustering results. We have also
plotted the results of the clustering algorithm for dataset-I and dataset-II obtained
with different k values i.e., (5, 10, 20, 40, 60) in Fig. 5.3 and 5.4 to further support
our claim. In Fig. 5.3 and Fig. 5.4, the X and Y axis represents the coordinates of
the trajectories, whereas, each cluster is represented with a different color. We can
observe from Fig. 5.3 and Fig. 5.4 that the trajectories are well classified based on
their paths.
5.3.4 Clustering Efficiency
We have evaluated the efficiency of our clustering algorithm for a single round of
clustering. Fig. 5.5 shows the running time for the different proportions of the
Dataset-I.
We can make three observations from the Fig. 5.5. First, the execution time is
rising with the growth of data volume, i.e., the execution time is influenced by data
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(a) Dataset-I (b) Dataset-II
Figure 5.2: Evolution of BC and WC.
volume. Second, the running time of “K_MediodSingleNodeTime” is significantly
increasing with the increase in data size. This indicates the importance of MapReduce
implementation which shows less increase with the increase of the data volume. Third,
the overhead of performing the computation on encrypted trajectories is small by
using the Chamfer distance.
5.3.5 Communication and Computation Cost
The computational cost of our scheme is dependent upon the key generation and
data encryption which happens once only. The key generation processes involve the
selection of two random 2m × 2m invertible matrices. The computational cost of
encrypting a data object with m elements needs to compute 2m-dimensional dot
product operation using Equation 5.8. The computational complexity of calculating
directional Chamfer distance on Cloud is O(n2). Table C.2 compares the computa-
tional complexity of calculating the similarity between two trajectories using different
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(a) k=5 (b) k=10
(c) k=20 (d) k=40
(e) k=60
Figure 5.3: Clustering Results Using Directional Chamfer Distance for Dataset-I
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(a) k=5 (b) k=10
(c) k=20 (d) k=40
(e) k=60
Figure 5.4: Clustering Results Using Directional Chamfer Distance for Dataset-II
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Figure 5.5: Computational Cost For a Single Round of Clustering.
techniques [93, 110]. It can be seen from Table C.2 that the computational cost of
directional Chamfer is similar to many other existing schemes. However, most of
them do not consider the direction of trajectory while clustering.
The communication overhead of the proposed scheme is very low compared to other
schemes like [38, 95]. In [38, 95], after each iteration of the clustering algorithm, the
result of each iteration is sent back to the client to update the cluster centers. Specif-
ically, the client gets back the cluster membership matrix in encrypted form. The
client decrypts the data, update the cluster centers and return the new cluster centers
result back to Cloud. In our scheme we don’t have this communication overhead as
the proposed scheme does not send the per-iteration result back to the client.
5.3.6 Scalability
The ability to process m-times large job using m-times larger resources at the same
time as the original job is referred as scale-up ability. To perform the scalability anal-
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ysis, we split trajectories into 5 folds and obtain the clustering over 1/5 of trajectories
using 2 worker nodes first. Then, we increase the number of worker nodes to 4, 6, 8,
10 and the percentage of trajectories to 2/5, 3/5, 4/5, 5/5, respectively as shown in
Table C.3.
From Table C.3, we can observe that the execution time of the proposed scheme has
little increase with the increase of data size and the number of employed workers.
Therefore, it can be said that the proposed scheme is scalable, which demonstrates
that the algorithm is suitable for large scale data.
5.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have proposed a new distance measure for trajectories which
takes into account not only the different lengths of trajectories but also the direc-
tions. Based on the new distance measure we proposed the modified K-medoids
clustering algorithm for trajectories. Furthermore, Clouds are employed to increase
the efficiency of clustering algorithm by designing a clustering algorithm based on
MapReduce. To protect the privacy of the data on the Cloud, we employed a pri-
vacy preserving technique. Experimental results show that our algorithm can cluster
spatiotemporal data using Cloud computing technology without disclosing private
information. In the future work, the proposed scheme will be further validated on
larger datasets and we are planning to apply the hierarchical clustering algorithm to





Protecting the identity, location and query privacy of the smart health devices are
very important. In this thesis, we have identified several threats and presented some
techniques for the protection of identity, location and query privacy for the users’ of
smart devices.
Identity privacy of the user is breached if the authentication details can be correlated
with their activities. Location privacy of the user is at risk when the location of the
user is disclosed to any third party. Whereas the breach of query privacy is related
to the disclosure of contents of the query.
Chapter 3 studied the issues related to identity privacy of the users for smart health
devices. We have presented an anonymous authentication scheme utilizing rotating
group signatures based on ECC, which is both secure and efficient. The proposed
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scheme provided a mechanism for tractability with minimal compromise on privacy.
We have also utilized TOR to provide anonymity on the network layer.
Chapter 4 focused on the location privacy protection mechanism for the smart health
system. The core of the proposed mechanism is the novel perturbed location genera-
tion algorithm, which ensures privacy while maintaining the required level of accuracy.
Its aim is to ensure that no adversary can relate a user with his/her sensitive loca-
tions by accessing and/or analyzing his/her location information sent from the smart
device. This is achieved via adaptively changing the amount of location perturbation
by considering how far the actual location is from the sensitive locations.
Chapter 5 developed a privacy preserving clustering algorithm for spatiotemporal
data i.e., trajectories. We have proposed a new distance measure algorithm for tra-
jectories which takes into account not only the different lengths of trajectories but also
the directions. Based on the new distance measure we have proposed a clustering
algorithm for trajectories. Furthermore, Cloud computing is employed to increase
the efficiency of clustering algorithm by designing a clustering algorithm based on
MapReduce. To protect the privacy of the data on the Cloud, we have employed a
privacy preserving technique which ensures that the location data is protected while
being process on the public Cloud.
6.2 Future Research
There is a huge scope for further investigation of the privacy protection problems for




• In recent years, many schemes have been proposed to preserve the identity,
location and query privacy. However, these privacy preserving schemes are often
considered in isolation. For instance, a privacy preserving scheme for identity
privacy may give little or no attention to location and query privacy and vice
versa. The schemes proposed are also not compatible from one application
domain to another. Thus, we need to develop standards for developing these
privacy preserving schemes which takes into account the system as a whole and
also addresses interoperability between different application domains.
• The anonymized data protects the privacy of the user by removing the personal
details making it hard to identify the individual from the anonymized data.
However, with the advancement in data mining techniques and availability of
many public data sources, the existing anonymization techniques are becoming
ineffective. We need new anonymization techniques which are vulnerable to
different attacks by studying existing attack models.
• Many privacy preserving schemes are device dependent. The existing privacy
protection schemes such as RSA are good for data storing purposes. However,
if we want to process the user query on the data, we need encryption schemes
like homomorphic encryption. Such schemes allow data to be processed in the
encrypted form. However, such schemes are not practical for smart devices
because of the device limitations such as battery life, storage, and processing
capabilities. To address these issues, we need to develop lightweight schemes







KT Long term keypair, the secret key KTS is known only to GM and the
public key KTP is known to everyone in the protocol
GnM The nth group signature master key, known to GM and RS
GnP The nth group signature public key, known to everyone in the protocol
KnE The nth log encryption key, the private key KNES is known only to GM,
the public key KNEP is known to RS and CSP
In The issue date of a group, when it starts being valid
En The expiry date of a group, when it stops being valid
Mni A signing key for nth group held by member i
Cni A transcript of the process that generated Mni that can be used along
with GnM to produce a revocation for member i
c A randomly generated challenge
Z The request to be authenticated


















Anonymity X X3 X X X X X
Mutual
Authentication
X × X X X ×8 X
Forward
Unlinkability
X X3 ×5 × X X X
Traceability X X X X × X X
Revocation ×1 × X X × X X
Efficient
Credential Update
X2 X X ×6 X X9 X
Communication
Integrity




X ×4 X X X X X
Resistance to
MitM Attacks
X ×4 X X X7 X X
Resistance to
Replay Attacks
X × X X X ×10 X
Table A.2: Comparison of Features
Page 103
A.3 Appendix A
A.3 Comparison of Algorithmic Complexities
Protocols Initialization Registration Authentication Revocation
2 EA
1 KG (RSA) 2 DA
Djellalbia [71] 4 KG (RSA)









3 ECM 7 ECA







10 ECM 2 ECA
Li [72] Choose parameters 2 H 2 EP Undefined
1 KG 4 ECA 1 EA
6 EP 1 DA
2 MAC
2 ECM
1 ES 9 + 2*α H
Choose parameters 4 H 1 ES




1 EP 2 EP
1 KG 1 DS
7 ECM
1 H 3 ECA
Liu [73] Choose parameters 2 ECM 4 H Undefined
2 KG 1 KG 1 EP
2 EP 2 E
33 E
Choose parameters r + 7 ECM
Sudarsono [19] 2 ∗m+ 2 E 2 E r + 9 EP 1 E
2 H
1 EA
Choose parameters 3 E 2 E
Our Protocol 1 KG 3 ECM r + 7 ECM 2 DA
1 E 1 EA 2 EP m+ 1 ECM
3 EA 2 EP 2 H
2 DA
Table A.3: Comparison of Algorithmic Complexities
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A.4 Comparison of Execution Times












913.86 + 4 ECA






185.47 + ES + KG
385.56 + 29.24 α +
n+ 1/n identity










127.02 3206 + 126.99*r 63.51
Our Protocol
217.15 + Choose
parameters + 1 KG
493.64 582.05 + 30.67*r 67.59 + 30.67*m
Table A.4: Comparison of Execution Times
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Djellalbia [71] 0 2 10 N/A
Kuzhal-
vaimozhi [8]
1 3 1 N/A
Li [72] 1 4 2 N/A
Lin [15] 1 3 1+1/t N/A
Liu [73] 1 2 2 N/A
Sudarsono [19] 0 2 2 1
Our Protocol 2 4 3 5
Table A.5: Communication Overhead for Protocols
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A.6 Comparison of Communication Lengths per Round









Djellalbia [71] 0 3081 6914 N/A
Kuzhal-
vaimozhi [8]
368 864 640 N/A
Li [72] 544 2592 1856 N/A
Lin [15] 378 768 1024+(320+n*1344)/n N/A
Liu [73] 376 1952 1056 N/A
Sudarsono [19] 840+512*m 288 7045 32
Our Protocol 1480 576 2368 768*m+1024






B.1 Closeness Measure of the Proposed Mechanism
for Different Values of rL where rU = 120.
rL
Hausdorff Distance(HD) Euclidean Distance-Modified (EDM)
θs = 45
0 θs = 75
0 θs = 45
0 θs = 45
0 θs = 75
0 θs = 45
0
p = 0.8 p = 0.8 p = 0.4 p = 0.8 p = 0.8 p = 0.4
HD σHD HD σHD HD σHD EDM σEDM EDM σEDM EDM σEDM
20 98.17 13.71 102.05 11.29 88.7 14.08 38.24 0.98 38.25 0.97 31.39 2.83
25 98.11 14.55 102.09 11.77 88.52 14.71 41.78 1 41.71 1.01 34.38 2.93
30 97.21 15.46 101.96 12.54 87.91 15.55 45.22 1.01 45.25 1.01 37.4 3.03
35 97.28 16.35 101.99 13.14 87.29 15.78 48.78 1.09 48.73 1.1 40.12 3.11
40 96.7 17.01 102.18 13.27 86.85 16.64 52.26 1.11 52.27 1.12 42.93 3.28
45 97.23 17.3 101.88 14.1 86.55 17.13 55.8 1.15 55.78 1.21 45.84 3.37
50 96.87 17.91 102.76 14.17 86.27 17.31 59.26 1.21 59.29 1.21 48.79 3.54
55 96.92 17.73 102.52 13.8 86.26 17.73 62.76 1.21 62.77 1.31 51.64 3.78
60 97.51 17.16 102.72 13.58 86.22 17.52 66.31 1.35 66.32 1.31 54.44 3.93
65 98.04 16.47 103.03 13.08 86.84 17.15 69.84 1.39 69.84 1.37 57.37 4.14
70 98.33 15.63 103.35 12.62 87.5 16.24 73.33 1.44 73.37 1.41 60.29 4.22
75 99.41 14.41 103.96 11.88 88.73 15.4 76.82 1.51 76.87 1.55 63.18 4.42
80 100.53 12.92 104.43 10.95 89.92 14.17 80.39 1.55 80.32 1.62 66.06 4.62
85 101.24 11.71 104.88 10.22 91.34 12.79 83.88 1.62 83.86 1.62 68.89 4.77
90 102.35 10.31 105.63 9.22 93.55 11.65 87.44 1.67 87.41 1.73 71.74 4.95
95 103.31 8.94 106.13 8.22 95.71 10.52 90.94 1.78 90.91 1.81 74.61 5.08
100 104.57 7.42 106.97 7.14 98.07 9.33 94.42 1.81 94.44 1.83 77.61 5.32
105 106.16 6.02 108.19 5.86 100.77 8.52 97.94 1.89 97.93 1.87 80.53 5.42
110 108.47 4.95 110.11 4.67 103.6 7.96 101.46 1.91 101.43 1.93 83.42 5.72
Table B.1: Closeness Measure of the Proposed Mechanism for Different Values of rL
where rU = 120.
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B.2 Closeness Measure of the Proposed Mechanism
for Different Values of rU where rL = 40.
rU
Hausdorff Distance(HD) Euclidean Distance-Modified (EDM)
θs = 45
0 θs = 75
0 θs = 45
0 θs = 45
0 θs = 75
0 θs = 45
0
p = 0.8 p = 0.8 p = 0.4 p = 0.8 p = 0.8 p = 0.4
HD σHD HD σHD HD σHD EDM σEDM EDM σEDM EDM σEDM
70 64.28 3.31 64.53 3.32 58.31 8.11 42.18 0.83 42.21 0.85 34.71 2.43
75 68.02 3.97 68.64 3.82 61.91 8.75 43.17 0.88 43.21 0.87 35.51 2.52
80 71.72 4.85 72.81 4.47 65.37 9.24 44.22 0.91 44.22 0.88 36.37 2.62
85 75.23 5.96 76.73 5.25 68.37 9.97 45.21 0.95 45.2 0.94 37.15 2.68
90 78.57 7.42 80.66 6.23 71.52 10.74 46.24 0.91 46.22 0.94 38.04 2.76
95 81.83 8.85 84.42 7.15 74.16 11.35 47.24 0.98 47.22 0.99 38.83 2.81
100 85.06 10.46 88.3 8.22 77.22 12.17 48.24 1.01 48.24 1.14 39.74 2.87
105 88.15 12.14 91.61 9.62 79.43 13.29 49.24 1.02 49.24 1.05 40.47 3.04
110 91.15 13.72 95.16 10.92 82.04 14.14 50.24 1.04 50.24 1.08 41.32 3.08
115 94.24 15.41 99.04 11.87 84.42 15.41 51.25 1.07 51.29 1.15 42.08 3.17
120 96.82 17.16 102.22 13.24 87.22 16.74 52.28 1.12 52.26 1.14 43.03 3.28
125 99.71 18.76 105.47 14.65 89.39 17.72 53.29 1.14 53.28 1.17 43.86 3.37
130 102.35 19.96 107.98 16.39 91.59 18.75 54.26 1.17 54.29 1.16 44.62 3.52
135 104.86 21.37 111.28 17.41 93.65 19.83 55.28 1.21 55.3 1.25 45.51 3.57
140 107.44 22.69 114.46 18.41 95.21 20.56 56.27 1.24 56.35 1.21 46.38 3.62
145 109.54 24.1 116.87 19.83 96.97 21.21 57.34 1.27 57.33 1.26 47.08 3.76
150 111.84 25.32 119.61 21.12 98.67 22.19 58.3 1.33 58.32 1.32 47.97 3.86
155 114.16 26.04 122.42 22.06 100.21 22.64 59.34 1.36 59.34 1.33 48.75 3.92
160 115.33 27.17 124.57 23.02 102.45 23.42 60.34 1.37 60.32 1.42 49.54 4.02
Table B.2: Closeness Measure of the Proposed Mechanism for Different Values of rU





C.1 Between Like and Within Like Criteria
No of Clusters
Dataset-I Dataset-II
Between Like Within Like Between Like Within Like
5 93.44 6.55 92.38 8.52
10 95.60 4.39 94.45 5.65
20 99.05 0.94 96.40 4.6
40 99.88 0.11 98.90 2.10
60 99.92 0.07 99.85 0.25
Table C.1: Between Like and Within Like Criteria
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C.2 Comparison of Computational Cost for Differ-
ent Similarity Measures Techniques
Name Metric type Different length Direction Computation cost
Euclidean Distance metric × × O(n)
DTW symmetric X × O(n2)
LCSS symmetric X × O(n2)
ERP symmetric X × O(n2)
Hausdorff metric X × O(n2)
Frechet metric X × O(n2 log n2)
Discrete Frechet symmetric X × O(n2)
OWD symmetric X × O(n2 log n)
SSPD symmetric X X O(n2)
Directional Chamfer symmetric X X O(n2)





Fold No of trajectories No of Workers Execution time
1 456 2 1309.743628
2 912 4 2302.376521
3 1368 6 3636.035079
4 1824 8 4742.343194
5 2280 10 5905.488919
Table C.3: Scalability Analysis
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C.4 Comparison of Distance Between Plain and En-
crypted Trajectories





















D.1 Algorithm to Generate Dummy Locations
Algorithm 1: Algorithm to generate dummy location
Input: Ti = (xi, yi), Ti+1(xi+1, yi+1), I = {I1, I2, ..., Im}, k1, k2, θs, rL, rU , p
Output: T ′i = (x′i, y′i)
Set θ1 = 00, θq = 1800, and rq = 0.
Compute {fi,1, fi,2, ..., fi,m from Ti = (xi, yi), I, k1, and k2, using eq. (4.9).
Calculate rmi from {fi,1, fi,2, ..., fi,m, rL, and rU using eq. (4.10).
while (|θq − θ1| > θs) or (rq < p) do
Generate two pseudo-random values q1 and q2 from the standard uniform
distribution on the open interval (0, 1).
Compute random angle θq = (3600).q1.
Compute random distance rq =
√
q2.







Calculate x′i = (rmi × rq) cos(θq) + xi and y′i = (rmi × rq) sin(θq) + yi





E.1 Algorithm for Chamfer Distance
Algorithm 2: Chamfer distance
Input : Trajectory Ta = {(xa1, ya1), (xa2, ya2), . . . , (xaN , yaN)}, trajectory
Tb = {(xb1, yb1), (xb2, yb2), . . . , (xbM , ybM)}
Output: Chamfer distance d(Ta, Tb)
1 dpos(Ta, Tb) = 0;
2 Dapos = DistanceTransform(Ta);
3 for i = 1 to M do








6 dpos(Ta, Tb) = dpos(Ta, Tb)/M ;
7 Output dpos(Ta, Tb);
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E.2 Algorithm for Distance Transform
Algorithm 3: Distance transform
Input : Trajectory T = {(x1, y1), (x2, y2), . . . , (xN , yN)}
Output: distance transform Dpos
1 Initialize the matrix Dpos with ones;
2 Draw every segment of the trajectory T on the matrix Dpos such that the locations
of the trajectory have the value 0;
3 for every non zero value location p in Dpos do
4 get min distance m between p and all zero locations of Dpos;





E.3 Algorithm for Directional Chamfer Distance
Algorithm 4: Directional Chamfer distance
Input : Trajectory Ta = {(xa1, ya1), (xa2, ya2), . . . , (xaN , yaN)}, trajectory
Tb = {(xb1, yb1), (xb2, yb2), . . . , (xbM , ybM)}, λ
Output: directional Chamfer distance d(Ta, Tb)
1 dpos(Ta, Tb) = 0;




4 for i = 1 to M − 1 do














7 θb = Direction((xbi , ybi ), (xbi+1, ybi+1));
8 ddir(Ta, Tb) = ddir(Ta, Tb) + |θa − θb|;
9 end
10 dpos(Ta, Tb) = dpos(Ta, Tb)/M ;
11 ddir(Ta, Tb) = ddir(Ta, Tb)/M ;
12 d(Ta, Tb) = dpos(Ta, Tb) + λ× ddir(Ta, Tb) ;
13 Output d(Ta, Tb);
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E.4 Algorithm for k-mediods Clustering
Algorithm 5: k-medoids clustering
Input : Set of L trajectories T = {T1, . . . , TL}, number of clusters K
Output: Medoids M , cluster membership C
1 Initialize M randomly by select K from the L trajectories as the medoids;
2 while no change in M do
3 for l = 1 to L do
4 Update C:
5 Compute the distance from Tl to all cluster centers T [M ];
6 Reassign trajectory Tl to the cluster with smallest distance;
7 end
8 for k = 1 to K do
9 Update M :
10 Compute the distance from every trajectory in cluster k to all trajectories in
the cluster;
11 Sum the computed distance for every trajectory;
12 Select the trajectory that has the minimum sum of distances within cluster k
as the new medoid;
13 end
14 end
15 Output M , C;
Page 122
E.5 Appendix E
E.5 Algorithm for MapReduce based on k-mediods
Algorithm 6: Map-reduce based Implementation for k-mediods
Input : Set of L trajectories T = {T1, . . . , TL}, number of clusters K,
number of folds F
Output: Medoids M , cluster membership C
1 Initialize M randomly by select K from the L trajectories as the medoids;
2 {T1, . . . , TF} = split(T , F );
3 while no change in M do
4 for f = 1 to F do
5 Initial Mapper:
6 If = Map((∀j ∈ Tf ) ,GetNearestCenter (j, Tj, T [M ]));
7 Initial Reducer:
8 Rf = Reduce((∀m ∈ If ) , add(key(m));
9 end
10 R = R1 ∪R2 ∪ · · · ∪ RF ;
11 Get C from R;
12 for k = 1 to K do
13 Ck = C[k];
14 D = zeros(|Ck|);
15 {C1k , . . . , CFk } = split(Ck, F );
16 for i = 1 to |Ck| do
17 for f = 1 to F do
18 Final Mapper:








21 D[i] = D[i] + Reduce((∀m ∈ If ) , add((m));
22 end
23 end





27 Output M , C; Page 123
E.5 Appendix E
1 Function GetNearestCenter(j, Tj, T ):
2 N = size(T );
3 D = zeros(1,N);
4 for n = 1 to N do
5 D[n] = DirectionalChamferDistance(Tj, T [n]);
6 end
7 m = arg minD;
8 return (key = m, “j”) ;
1 Function GetNewCenter(T ):
2 N = size(T );
3 D = zeros(N ,N);
4 for i = 1 to N do
5 for j = 1 to N do
6 if i = j then
7 continue;
8 end







13 m = arg minS;
14 return m ;
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E.6 Algorithm for Encrypted Directional Chamfer
Distance
Algorithm 7: Encrypted directional Chamfer distance
Input : Encrypted Trajectory Ta and Tb
Output: Encrypted directional Chamfer distance d(Ta, Tb)
1 Dpos = 0;
2 Ddir = 0;
3 N = size(Ta);
4 for di in Ta do
5 mind =∞;
6 minidx = −1;
7 for dj in Tb do
8 P = compute distance between Eref(di), Etgt(dj) using Equation 5.7;
9 if P < mind then
10 mind = P ;
11 minidx = j;
12 end
13 end
14 mina = compute distance between Eref(ai), Etgt(aminidx) using
Equation 5.7;
15 Dpos = Dpos +mind;
16 Ddir = Ddir +mina;
17 end
18 Dpos = Dpos/N ;
19 Ddir = Ddir/N ;
20 return Dpos + λDdir ;
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